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I. Introduction
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) are preferential trade
arrangements that favor their members by reducing trade barriers
below the level of reduction under the multilateral system.' RTAs
are an exception from the rule of non-discrimination, which
constitute the cornerstone of the multilateral trade system.2 The
I See Armand de Mestral, NAFTA Dispute Settlement: Creative Experiment or
Confusion?, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 359
(Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006) (examining NAFTA's dispute settlement
proceedings vis-A-vis the multilateral system).
2 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Prologue, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
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General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) Article XXIV
recognizes that the aim of RTAs is to facilitate world trade; this
goal is furthered by the inclusion of all trade sectors and
diminished by the exclusion of major ones.3
RTAs, however, are gaining attention not only as they increase
quantitatively, but also because of the economic and legal
challenges they produce.4 Various economists have analyzed the
economic theory of RTAs and offered divergent opinions on the
economic efficiency of RTAs. 5 However, the legal challenges that
RTAs present have not received the same attention as the
economic challenges in empirical and theoretical scholarship.
6
This, in my judgment, results from many reasons; first, there is a
misconception that the issue of RTAs is an economic one, and the
best way to address it is through economic analysis; second, the
strong political factors that are involved in forming RTAs, and
their key role after RTAs enter into force, give the impression that
A-I 1, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
3 Id.
4 See Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue, in TRADING BLOCS, ALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES TO ANALYZING PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 105, 107 (Jadish
Bhagwati & Arvind Panagariya eds., 1999) (Jacob Viner warned that RTAs, especially
customs unions can have "trade diversion" consequences. He defines "trade diversion"
by arguing that
There will be other commodities which one of the members of the
customs union will now newly import from the other whereas before
the customs union it imported them from a third country, because that
was the cheapest possible source of supply even after payment of
duty. The shift in the locus of production is now not as between the
two member countries but as between a low-cost third country and
the other, high-cost, member country. This is a shift of the type
which the protectionist approves, but it is not one which the free-
trader who understands the logic of his own doctrine can properly
approve.)
5 See Pateriiza Tumbarello, Are Regional Trade Agreements Stumbling or
Building Blocks? Implications for Mekong-3 Countries, 5 (IMF Working Paper No.53,
2007) (describing the negative ramifications of trade diversion); see also Rymond
Riezman, Can Bilateral Trade Agreements Help Induce Free Trade?, 3, available at
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/rriezman/papers/mvbl2.pdf (citing scholars who favor
regionalism such as Nordstorm, Perroni and Whalley).
6 Few books were written on the legal aspects of regionalism, so far among them
are: JAMES H. MATHIS, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE GATT/WTO, ARTICLE
XXIV AND THE INTERNAL TRADE REQUIREMENT (2002); and REGIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 359 (2006).
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forming RTAs is essentially the result of political and economic
processes rather than a legal one; third, the confusion that
surrounds the applicable law on RTAs (GATT Article XXIV,
GATS Article V, the Enabling Clause, the Understanding on
Article XXIV, and the Transparency Mechanism) makes legal
analysis challenging. It is particularly important to understand the
economic theory of RTAs before exploring their legal aspects.
Finally, the case law on RTAs, particularly in the World Trade
Organization (WTO), is still evolving, which discourages legal
scholars from adopting positions at this point in time.
Thinking about RTAs as a legal challenge is no less important
than analyzing their economic and political impacts. For one, the
WTO agreements, as all RTAs, are legal texts that are interpreted
pursuant to The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.7
Likewise, a legal examination is crucial to analyze the relationship
between the multilateral and regional trade orders; this analysis
cannot be done through a strictly economic lens. Moreover, as
will be thoroughly illustrated in this article, WTO panels have
been very helpful in addressing controversial issues in RTAs, and
arguably, the legal analysis will be central to providing discipline
to the high number of RTAs. In short, a close legal examination is
timely and worthy because it reveals that RTAs threaten the
existence of the WTO by offering alternative trade options to the
global-based trading order.
This article seeks to clarify several legal issues posed by RTAs
and set them in an analytical framework. Part I describes why
WTO Members are forming RTAs, and briefly reviews the
economic theory of RTAs. This part is important to define RTAs
and why they have developed. Part II identifies the types of RTAs
that are recognized by the GATT. It should be noted, however,
that other forms of RTAs exist that offer deeper economic
integration and were not mentioned by the GATT. Part III focuses
on the legal questions that RTAs present, particularly with respect
to trade in goods. It also analyzes the substantive and procedural
conditions that are encompassed by the relevant WTO rules. In
doing so, Part III critically examines key provisions and terms in
the WTO law, in particular Article XXIV of the GATT. Perhaps
7 SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
(Manchester University Press, 2d. ed., 1984).
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most importantly, Part IV deals with regionalism in services. In
discussing both goods and services, WTO panel decisions will be
regularly analyzed. Finally, Part V outlines the efforts that have
been made to address the challenges of RTAs. This article
concludes by arguing that serious efforts should be made on the
regional and the multilateral level to maintain a healthy
multilateral system while at the same time ensuring that RTAs
adhere to the law pursuant to which they are established.
II. Motivations for Regionalization and the Economic
Theories of RTAs
Many legal scholars have stated that RTAs are political
phenomena. Commentators cite many overlapping reasons for the
rise of RTAs.8 First, "the excessive number of participants in the
GATT" 9 in the WTO has made trade negotiations harder and more
complex within the GATT as well as within the WTO. 10 Second,
the large gap between members' economies makes decision-
making even harder.11 Third, major international trade players
favor regionalism.1 2  Fourth, empirical evidence shows that
regionalism is economically and politically beneficial.13
Some commentators believe that the fiist two 'reasons are not
as evident as the third and fourth reasons. 14 Nonetheless, the first
three reasons are still very popular justifications for crafting
RTAs. Countries have found it easier to associate with other
countries with similar levels of economic and political maturity.' 5
8 See, e.g., JAMES H. MATHIS, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE GATT/WTO,
ARTICLE XXIV AND THE INTERNAL TRADE REQUIREMENT 140 (2002) (citing Paul
Krugman, Regionalism Versus Multilateralism: Analytical Notes, in NEW DIMENSIONS IN
REGIONAL INTEGRATION 74-75 (Center for Economic Policy Research 1993)).
9 Id.
10 Id.
I1 Id.
12 Id.
13 See Riezman, supra note 5; see also John Whalley, Why Do Countries Seek
Regional Trade Agreements 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
5552, 1996) (highlighting political concerns for countries who form RTAs).
14 Id.
15 See Mathis, supra note 8, at 140 (arguing that the severely uneven distribution of
wealth among members make it difficult to reach decisions on controversial trade issues
in the WTO, unlike the case where countries negotiate with economically compatible
2008]
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It is also less difficult to negotiate with fewer countries on trade
policies than it is to negotiate with dozens of WTO member-states.
Further, concerns over a possible failure of the multilateral trade
negotiations have encouraged more countries to form their own
markets, 16 especially after the collapse of multilateral negotiations
in Mexico in 2003 and the hardships that the Doha Round is
encountering. 17
As RTAs proliferate, justifications proliferate too.18  States
strive to strengthen their influence in multilateral trade and
international fora.19 States view RTAs as an "insurance policy"
should the multilateral system fail and the "world slip into
competing [and perhaps hostile] regional blocks., 20 For example,
one of the reasons that encouraged Asian and Pacific countries to
form the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was to
counter NAFTA's possible protectionist effects. 21  Last but not
partners).
16 See, e.g., Melaku Geboye Desta, The Bumpy Ride Towards the Establishment of
"a Fair and Market Oriented Agricultural Trading System" at the WTO: Reflections
Following the Cancun Setback, 8 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 489 (2003) (discussing the collapse
of Cancun's negotiations); see also M. Ulric Killion, China's Foreign Currency Regime:
The Kagan Thesis and Legalification of the WTO Agreement, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 43, 84 (2004) (stating that the collapse of Cancun multilateral negotiations was
because "countries could not come to a consensus and nearly brought a collapse to the
Doha Development Agenda").
17 Desta, supra note 16.
18 Other factors are coming to play when forming RTAs, such as maintaining
security as in the case of ASEAN. In 1971, ASEAN leaders signed the Zone of Peace,
Freedom and Neutrality Declaration of November 27, 1971. See Zone of Peace,
Freedom and Neutrality, 27 November, 1971, Indon.-Malay.-Phil.-Sing.-Thail., reprinted
in 11 I.L.M. [Kuala Lumpur Declaration].
19 Bob Switky, The Importance of Trading Blocks: Theoretical Foundations, in
THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS 13, 18 (Bart Kerremans &
Bob Switky eds., 2000). By the same token, states might consider joining an RTA as a
method to join a better RTA. This was obvious in Latin America and Europe where:
In some of the Latin American arrangements... a group of countries
has more leverage in accession negotiations to NAFTA than would
individual countries. In Eastern Europe after 1989, the prior regional
negotiations between Hungry, Poland and Czechoslovakia helped
increase the leverage of each country vis-A-vis EU accession
negotiations. Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 19.
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least, other miscellaneous concerns are involved in the formation
RTAs, including politics, security (e... preventing illegal
immigration), and environmental concerns.
Economists measure the merits of any RTA in two
dimensions: first, the economic benefit that members of an RTA
acquire after the formation of the RTA (trade creation), and
second, the economic disadvantage that third parties and the
parties themselves bear as a result of the formation of RTAs (trade
diversion).23 The first dimension means that intra-regional trade
has expanded, which constitutes a positive consequence.24 The
second dimension refers to the loss of trade resulting from the
formation of an RTA, which is the negative dimension.25 In fact,
no RTA has solely trade creation effects; trade diversion will
result as a natural and normal consequence of trade creation.
Thus, the question in determining the conformity of an RTA to
Article XXIV of the GATT is whether trade creation outweighs
trade diversion.26
RTA opponents argue that RTAs present a grave challenge to
the global economy and the multilateral trade regime because they
undermine "the widely-shared objectives of multilateral free
trade. 27  RTAs are stumbling blocks in the world economy
because according to some economists, "negotiators frequently
seek to exclude from regional FTAs precisely those sectors that
would be most threatened by welfare-enhancing trade creation.
28
22 See RACING TO REGIONALIZE: DEMOCRACY, CAPITALISM AND REGIONAL
POLITICAL ECONOMY 156 (Kenneth P. Thomas & Mary Ann Tetreault eds., 1999)
(explaining the reflections of geopolitics of eastern and western Europe on the
citizenship policy of the EU).
23 See Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue, in TRADING BLOCS, ALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES TO ANALYZING PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 105, 107 (Jadish
Bhagwati & Arvind Panagariya eds., 1999).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. (explaining that the benefit or the harm to the international economy depends
on which dimension predominates, trade creation or trade diversion).
27 Jadish Bhagwati, Regionalism and Multilateralism: an Overview, in NEW
DIMENSIONS IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION 22, 46 (Jaime de Melo & Arvid Panagariya eds.,
1993) (calling the phenomenon of the proliferation of RTAs the spaghetti bowl
phenomenon where RTAs create an artifact production network of countries that would
not be consistent with the principle of economic efficiency).
28 JEFFRY FRANKEL, REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC SYSTEM
2008]
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Put differently, RTA member-states tend to protect "less-
competitive or inefficient domestic industries . . . from the rigors
of wide open global competition. ' '29  Similarly, some scholars
view RTAs as a major setback for the multilateral trade regime
represented by the GATT because RTAs are "discriminatory" and
can "be viewed as a factor making for disintegration, rather than
integration, within the world economy as a whole., 30  For
example, Mexican apparel can receive tariff-free treatment within
NAFTA only if it is produced with North American textiles and
yam.31 In sum, some economists think that the main damage of
RTAs is the trade diversion that occurs at the expense of third
parties.
32
On the other hand, other economists see that RTAs boost trade
and increase trade specialization.33 The most cited example is the
case of Mexico and NAFTA, whereby Mexico's trade benefits are
evident.34 Those economists also use empirical research outcomes
which prove the constructive role of RTAs in the global
economy.35 Likewise, these economists argue that RTAs can be
considered a "stepping-stone" towards an ultimate, and fully
integrated global economy.36 RTAs, according to regionalists, can
212 (1997).
29 MAY T. YEUNG ET AL., REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:
THE EU AND ASEAN 19 (1999).
30 David Henderson, International Economic Integration: Progress, Prospect and
Implications, 68 INT'L AFF. 633, 644 (1992).
31 Robert Hormats, Making Regionalism Safe, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 97, 104 (2004).
32 Anne Krueger, Are Preferential Trading Arrangements Trade-Liberalizing or
Protectionist?, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 105, 107 (1999).
33 See, e.g., Robert Zoellick, Unleashing the Trade Winds, ECONOMIST, Dec. 5,
2002.
34 See, e.g., id.
35 See, e.g., id.
36 See id. The United States Representative Robert Zoellick asserted that
Whether the cause is democracy, security, economic integration or
free trade, advocates of reform often need to move towards a broad
goal step by step--working with willing partners, building coalitions,
and gradually expanding the circle of cooperation. Just as modem
business markets rely on the integration of networks, we need a web
of mutually reinforcing trade agreements to meet diverse commercial,
economic, developmental and political challenges. The United States
is combining this building-block approach to free trade with a clear
[Vol. XXXIII
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be a phase in which countries examine certain liberalization
strategies on a regional scale before applying them in a
multilateral context.37  In this light, other economists argue that
RTAs do not necessarily enhance welfare, yet, they also may not
be harmful.38 In other words, these economists approach the issue
of RTAs on a case-by-case basis.
III. Regional Trade Agreements that are Recognized by Article
XXIV
Article XXIV of the GATT mentions three types of RTAs:
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), Customs Unions (CUs), and
interim agreements that lead to the formation of FTAs or CUs.
3 9
Nevertheless, RTAs can take different forms other than those
mentioned under Article XXIV, such as Common Markets,4 °
Economic Unions,4' and Monetary Unions.
commitment to reducing global barriers to trade through the WTO.
Id.
37 Vincent Cable, Overview, in TRADE BLOCS? THE FUTURE OF REGIONAL
INTEGRATION 1, 12 (Vincent Cable & David Henderson eds., 1994) (arguing that RTAs
are a "useful laboratory for new approaches to deeper integration which can be applied
multilaterally").
38 William Watson & Viet D. Do, Economic Analysis of Regional Trade
Agreements, http://www.mcgill.ca/files/economics/economicanalysisof.pdf (last visited
Sept. 12, 2007).
39 GATT, supra note 2, art. XXIV:4.
40 See, e.g., Nicole Rothe, Freedom of Establishment of Legal Persons Within the
European Union: An Analysis of the European Court of Justice Decision in the
Uberseering Case, 53 AM. U.L. REv. 1103 (2004) (analyzing the EU as a common
market).
41 Economic Unions combine members that share long-term economic missions.
Economic Unions incorporate common monetary policies, fiscal arrangements, and
political autonomy. They also have institutions with high-level capabilities and
authorities to mange the monetary, social, and legal harmonization efforts. See, e.g.,
Bryan Schwartz, Strengthening Canada: Challenges for Internal Trade & Mobility:
Lessons from Experience: Improving the Agreement of Internal Trade, 2 ASPER REV.
INT'L Bus. & TRADE L. 301 (2002) (discussing Canada's trade and commercial policies
as an Economic Union).
42 See Joshua M. Wepman, Article 104(c) of the Maastricht Treaty and European
Monetary Union: Does Ireland Hold the Key to Success?, 19 B.C. INT'L& COMP. L. REv.
247 (1996) (defining "Monetary Union").
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A. Customs Unions
Article XXIV:8(a) defines a CU as "the substitution of a single
customs territory for two or more customs territories so that duties
and other restrictive regulations of commerce... are eliminated
with respect to 'substantially all the trade' between parties.
' ' 3
Yet, the elimination does not have to be absolute; 44 members of
CUs may still exempt trade from liberalization when necessary in
light of GATT Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, and XX.
45
Article XXIV:8(a) requires parties who form CUs to
implement "substantially the same duties and other regulation of
46commerce" to trade with other countries. In other words, CUs
are required to have common external tariffs (CET) to be applied
to all goods imported into the CU.47 To minimize the negative
impact on third parties, Article XXIV:5 requires the new CET and
the other regulations of commerce not to be "higher or more
restrictive" than they were "prior to the formation of the free-trade
area."' 48  Otherwise, if the CETs cause an increase in any
individual member's bound tariffs, paragraph 6 indicates that
Article XXVIII shall apply.49
B. Free Trade Agreements
FTAs are trade agreements by which member-states eliminate
internal trade barriers and tariffs.50 FTA members maintain their
43 GATT, supra note 2, art. XXIV:8(a).
44 Appellate Body Report, Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing
Products, WT/D34/AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Turkey-Textiles AB Report]. (The
Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that Article XXIV: 8 offers some flexibility, yet
the AB warned that this flexibility should not be abused.)
45 GATT, supra note 2, art. XXIV:8(a).
46 Id. art. XXIV:8(a)(ii).
47 Id.
48 Id. art. XXIV:5(a).
49 Id. art. XXIV:6. Article XXVIII requires interested parties to negotiate the
withdrawal or modification of such duties in order to reach a compensatory arrangement
for the affected party. See generally Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994; Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex LA, Legal Instruments -
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1161 art. 4 (1994) [hereinafter Article
XXIV Understanding].
50 De Mestral, supra note I.
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original tariff-rates for non-member imports.5' In this light,
Article XXIV identifies FTAs "a group of two or more customs
territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of
commerce ... are eliminated on substantially all the trade between
the constituent territories in products originating in such
territories. 52
Unlike CUs, FTAs do not have CETs.53 FTAs enable each
member to retain its trade policy with third parties.54 This
characteristic eases economic integration with countries that do
not have common borders or are not even geographically close to
each other. This fact partially explains why FTAs are the most
popular type of RTAs in the world.
One of the primary difficulties associated with FTAs is trade
deflection.55 In order to prevent exploiting the zero tariff rate
between FTA members by third parties, FTAs typically create
"rules of origin" to identify which products should be eligible for a
tariff-free treatment.56  Rules of origin are the method by which
goods that qualify to receive tariff-free treatment within the FTA
51 RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW: THE GAT -- WTO SYSTEM,
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, AND U.S. LAW 162 (1998).
52 GATT, supra note 2, art XXIV: 8(b).
53 See GATT, supra note 2, art XXIV: 8.
54 Id.
55 See Jonathan M. Cooper, NAFTA's Rule of Origin and Its Effect on the North
American Automotive Industry, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 442, 452 (1994); see also
WTO Secretariat, Regional Trade Integration Under Transformation (Apr. 26, 2002), 10,
available at http://192.91.247.23/english/tratop-e/region-e/sem-apri102_- e/clemens_
boonekamp.doc [hereinafter WTO, Under Transformation] (explaining that the
justification of having rules of origin is to prevent trade deflection).
56 See Agreement on Rules of Origins, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex I A, Legal Instruments-Results of
the Uruguay Round, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1515 art. 1
(1994) [hereinafter GATT Agreement on Rules of Origin]. The GATT Agreement on
Rules of Origin defines rules of origin as:
[T]hose laws, regulations and administrative determinations of
general application applied by any Member to determine the country
of origin of goods provided such rules of origin are not related to
contractual or autonomous trade regimes leading to the granting of
tariff preferences going beyond the application of paragraph I of
Article I of GATT 1994.
20081
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are identified.57 Some commentators, however, are skeptical
about the rules of origin since they can be biased.58
There are two main categories of rules of origin: preferential
and non-preferential. 59 Preferential rules of origin typically exist
in RTAs to distinguish regional products from non-regional like
products, thus offering them a preferential treatment. 6 0 Non-
preferential rules of origin are used to determine a product's
country of origin for general purposes other than granting tariff
preferences "such as the application of duty rates to imports,
antidumping or countervailing duties, country-of-origin marking,
or the implementation of country-specific quotas and voluntary
export restraints.
61
The Agreement on Rules of Origin sets out general elements of
rules of origin.62 Article 2 of the Agreement on Rules of Origin
provides that rules of origin should be: (i) neutral, i.e., WTO
members ought not to exploit rules of origin to pursue non-trade
policies such as security and environmental policies,63 (ii) non-
discriminatory, 64 (iii) transparent,65 predictable and subject to the
due process of law. 6  Alongside this, the agreement established
the WTO Committee on Rules of Origin (CRO), and the WTO
Technical Committee on Rules of Origin (TCRO) to work on
harmonizing rules of origin.67 It is crucial to note, nonetheless,
that the Agreement on Rules of Origin covers only non-preferential
57 See generally D. Palmeter, Rules of Origin in Customs Unions and Free Trade
Areas, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 326 (K. Anderson
& R. Blackhurst eds., 1993).
58 A.O. Krueger , Free Trade Agreements as Protectionist Devices: Rules of Origin
8-12 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4352, 1993).
59 See Joseph A. LaNasa, Rules of Origin and the Uruguay Round's Effectiveness
in Harmonizing and Regulating Them, 90 AM. J. INT'L .L. 625, 626 (1996).
60 Id.
61 Lan Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in the Postnational Economy:
Rethinking U.S. Trade Laws, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 401,463 (2002).
62 See generally GATT Agreement on Rules of Origin, supra note 56.
63 See id. art. 2(b) and (c).
64 See id. art. 2(d).
65 See id. art. 2(a).
66 See id. art. 2(e) and (j).
67 See id. art. 4.
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rules of origin and not preferential rules of origin.68  Similarly,
unlike some RTAs that have rules of origin for investments and
services, 69 the Agreement on Rules of Origin does not cover
services or investments. 70  The Agreement on Rules of Origin
attempted to create a framework for harmonizing non-preferential
rules of origin by setting timetables for this purpose, but all
deadlines were missed due to the large number of goods involved
and the controversial nature of some products such as textiles.71
C. Interim Agreements
Building an RTA requires extensive coordination between the
prospective members. RTA member-countries are usually
required to amend their domestic laws in response to increased
72integration. Therefore, Article XXIV approves interim
agreements as providing a transition period to forming CUs or
FTAs. Pursuant to Article XXIV:(5), the purpose of interim
agreements is the formation of a CU or an FTA.73 Interim
agreements shall "include a plan and schedule" that specifies how
parties will use the interim agreement to form their RTA "within a
reasonable length of time." 4  Due to the fact that "reasonable
length of time" is a broad concept, the Understanding on Article
XXIV sets out that the reasonable length of time should not exceed
ten years, unless "exceptional circumstances" require otherwise.75
Two main concerns arise from the issue of interim agreements.
68 Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Working Part of the Trade
Comm., The Relationship Between Regional Trade Agreements and Multilateral Trading
System Rules of Origin, at 6, TD/TC/WP(2002)17/Final (Apr. 11, 2002) [hereinafter
OECD Rules of Origin].
69 NAFTA, in its cross-border trade chapter, established flexible rules for services
to enjoy free movement within NAFTA's borders.
70 See OECD Rules of Origin, supra note 68.
71 RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 666 (Lexis
Publishing 2d ed. 2001).
72 Countries who sign FTAs with the US are required to amend, for example, their
laws to meet certain US requirements, such as intellectual property rights requirements.
See Peter Drahos, Expanding Intellectual Property's Empire: the Role of FTAs 7,
available at http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?idarticle=401.
73 GATT, supra note 2, art. XXIV: 5(c).
74 Id.
75 See Article XXIV Understanding, supra note 49, 3.
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First, countries are not reporting their interim agreements so that
the WTO can examine their consistency with Article XXIV
(according to paragraph 7 (a) of Article XXIV). 76 Parties to RTAs
sideline the whole concept of interim agreements by stating that
they will implement their RTA gradually over a period of time that
might exceed ten years. 77 Such schemes enable members of RTAs
to overcome the notification requirement to the WTO regarding
the terms of their RTAs, and to have more leeway in deciding the
details of their agreements. 78 The second concern that arises is
whether the conditions applied to FTAs and CUs, particularly the
requirements of Article XXIV:(5) and (8), also apply to interim
agreements.79
IV. Legal Issues Posed by the Applicable Law
A. The Purpose of Regional Trade Agreements: Article
XXIV.4 & 5
Article XXIV:5 states that "the provisions of [the GATT
Agreement] shall not prevent, as between the territories of
contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-
trade area."'  This issue was discussed in an important case that
dealt with Turkey's quotas which constituted a wide range of
quantitative restrictions on textiles and clothing, including those
from India. 81 In the Turkey--Restrictions on Imports of Textiles
and Clothing Products case, India objected to Turkey's quotas and
claimed they were inconsistent with Articles XI and XIII of the
GATT 1994, as well as Article 2 of the Agreement on Textiles and
76 See World Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on Rules, Compendium of
Issues Related to Regional Trade Agreements, 55, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/8/REv.1
(Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
region e/region negoti-e.htm [hereinafter Regional Trade Agreements] (stating that
"very few have expressly been notified as [interim agreements]. As a consequence,
many of the detailed provisions specifically devoted to this type of RTA, both in
Article XXIV and in the 1994 Understanding, have practically become redundant").
77 See id. 57.
78 See id.
79 Id. 57.
80 GATT, supra note 2, art. XXIV:5.
81 Turkey--Textiles AB Report, supra note 44.
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Clothing (ATC).82 In its defense, Turkey claimed its quotas were
justified measures in the formation of a CU with the ,European
Union (EU) and therefore conformed to Article XXIV of the
GATT.8  Turkey asserted that the quotas were necessary in
forming the CU with the EU, and that Article XXIV:8 specifically
requires parties to CUs to harmonize their customs policies.8 4 The
Panel found that Turkey's measures were inconsistent with
Articles XI and XIII of the GATT 1994, and consequently
inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the ATC.85  The Panel also
rejected Turkey's assertion that its measures were justified by
Article XXIV of GATT 1994.86 The Appeals Board (AB) in this
case upheld the Panel's decision, although it differed in its
reasoning.
87
In dealing with the meaning of "shall not prevent" in Article
XXIV:5, the AB in the Turkey-Textiles case clarified the
meaning of "shall not prevent" by indicating that "the provisions
of the GATT 1994 shall not make impossible the formation" of an
RTA.88 The AB highlighted the chapeau of Article XXIV by
noting that inconsistent measures with the GATT's provision are
permissible only to the extent necessary to form an RTA. 89 The
AB went further to set up two conditions that RTAs must fulfill
when using the chapeau as a defense: first, RTA member-countries
should prove that their RTA has satisfied the requirements of
Article XXIV:8(a) and 5(a), and second, RTA members should
show it would be impossible to form the RTA unless "the measure
at issue is introduced" upon the formation of the RTA.90 It is not
yet known whether this also applies to FTAs since the Turkey-
Textiles case dealt with a CU issue and not an FTA issue.
Article 3.2 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
82 Id. § 24.
83 See id. §§ 6-7.
84 See id. § 10.
85 Id. § 42.
86 Id.
87 Turke)-Textiles AB Report, supra note 44, §§ 64-66.
88 Id. 45.
89 Id. 45-46.
90 Id. 58-59.
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Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) 91 states that WTO
agreements should be interpreted in accordance with the
customary rules of interpretation of public international law. With
this in mind, Article XXIV:4 stipulates that:
The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing
freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary
agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the
countries parties to such agreements. They also recognize that
the purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area should be
to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to
raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such
territories.
92
The drafters of the GATT confirmed in paragraph 4 of Article
XXIV that the trade liberalization between the members of RTAs
should not be at the expense of non-members. 93  The
Understanding on Article XXIV complemented this concept by
recognizing the importance of RTAs in the global economy, and
the positive impacts of the liberalization of "all trade" between the
members of an RTA.94 The Understanding asserted, however, that
RTAs "should to the greatest possible extent avoid creating
adverse effects on the trade of other Members." 95 The drafters of
Article XXIV and the Understanding implied that full
liberalization of trade is less trade-diverting than partial
liberalization.96 Nonetheless, many economists such as Bhagwati
argue that trade diversion will occur even if RTA members adopt
full-preference regimes.97
The AB in the Turkey-Textiles case affirmed the obligation of
facilitating trade and not raising barriers by invoking Article
91 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
2 art. 16.4, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 411,
33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
92 GATT, supra note 2, art. XXIV:4.
93 See id.
94 See Article XXIV Understanding, supra note 49.
95 Id.
96 See generally GATT, supra note 2, art. XXIV; Article XXIV Understanding,
supra note 49.
97 Jagdish Bhagwati, Preferential Trade Agreements: The Wrong Road, 27 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 865, 868 n.5 (1996).
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XXIV:4, and by emphasizing that the Understanding "explicitly
reaffirms this purpose," and states that in the formation or
enlargement of a customs union, the constituent members should
"to the greatest possible extent avoid creating adverse affects on
the trade of other Members." 98  The AB report went further to
state that paragraph 4 contains a "purposive" obligation, and not
an "operative" one.99 This means that paragraph 4 should be taken
into account when interpreting any other paragraph of Article
XXIV, including the chapeau of paragraph 5.100 Consequently, the
purpose of RTAs, according to Article XXIV, should be to expand
trade between the members of RTAs, and avoid, as much as
possible, the negative consequences of RTAs on third parties.'
0
'
Some scholars argue that Article XXIV:4 highlights the
economic framework of the whole article by which the legal
aspects should be understood. 10 2  Kenneth Dam argues in this
regard that Article XXIV should be construed to provide for trade-
creation standards by emphasizing that "[p]aragraph 4 sets forth
what could be considered the principal rule."' 0 3 This point of view
was argued by the representatives of several WTO members such
as Australia and Korea in the fifteenth session of the Committee of
Regional Trade Agreements (CTRA). 104 Those members asserted
that "Article XXIV:4 not only provided a guiding principle, but
also complemented other paragraphs in a substantive way."' 10 5 On
98 Turkey-Textiles AB Report, supra'note 44, 57.
99 Id.
oo See id.
lot See GATT, supra note 2 Article XXIV: 4. Article XXIV states that:
The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing
freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements,
of .closer integration between the economies of the countries parties
to such agreements. They also recognize that the purpose of a
customs union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade
between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the
trade of other contracting parties with such territories.
102 See, e.g., KENNETH DAM, THE GATT, LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANiZATION 276 (1970).
103 Id.
104 World Trade Organization, Comm. on Reg'l Trade Agreements, Note on the
Meetings of 27 November and 4-5 December 1997, 19-20, WT/REG/M/15 (Jan. 13,
1998) [hereinafter CRTA WT/REG/M/15].
los Id.
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the other side of the spectrum, the United States' representative
argued that "[t]here was no test in Article XXIV:4, and it was
never intended that there should be one."' 0 6 She argued that the
first paragraph of the Understanding provided that, to be
consistent, an RTA had to satisfy the provisions of paragraphs 5,
6, 7 and 8.""' The EU representative strongly agreed with the
United States.' 
08
Finally, the AB in the Turkey-Textiles case stated that Article
XXIV:4 "does not set forth a separate obligation itself but, rather,
sets forth the overriding and pervasive purpose for Article XXIV
which is manifested in operative language in the specific
obligations that are found elsewhere in Article XXIV." 109
B. Substantive Conditions
1. "Substantially All the Trade ": Article XXIV.'8
To minimize affecting third parties, GATT Article XXIV:8
requires that RTA members must eliminate trade restrictions with
respect to "substantially all the trade" between the "constituent
territories" of the RTA. l 10 Regarding CUs, Article XXIV:8(a)
states that
Duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except
where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII,
XIV, XV, XX) are eliminated with respect to substantially all
the trade between the constituent territories of the union or at
least with respect to substantiall l all the trade in products
originating in such territories ....
Whereas regarding FTAs, Article XXIV:8(b) states that
"[d]uties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except
where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII,
XIV, XV, XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade
between the constituent territories in products originating in such
106 Id. 24.
107 Id. 24.
108 Id.
1o9 Turkey-Textiles AB Report, supra note 44, T 57.
110 GATT, supra note 2, art. XXIV:8.
II' Article XXIV:8 (a).
[Vol. XXXIII
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
territories . . . .,,112 Article XXIV differentiates "between
"substantially all the trade" in FTAs and in CUs.1 3 In the case of
CUs, duties and restrictions on trade ought to be eliminated either
with respect to substantially all the trade between the CU
members, or with respect to substantially all trade in goods
originating within the CU borders.1 4 On the other hand, FTAs are
only required to eliminate restrictions on substantially all the trade
in products originating in the FTAs' territories." 5  This
differentiation reflects the nature of both CUs and FTAs; CUs are
a more advanced type of trade liberalization because trade barriers
are eliminated irrespective of the origin of goods (once they enter
the CU). In Article XXIV:8(b) however, trade barriers should be
eliminated solely on goods originating in the FTA territories.'
16
Debates have always revolved around whether "substantially
all" should be understood in qualitative terms (exclusion of major
sector) or quantitative ones (percentage of trade of the members
covered).' 11 GATT working parties that were established to
examine regional trade agreements, and later the Committee on
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA), have not been able to arrive
at a precise conclusion on the meaning and implications of
"substantially all the trade."" 8 To date, there is no consensus on
what percentage could be deemed "substantially," or "all the
trade." 1 19
Some WTO working parties, like Hong Kong and China SAR
attempted to define "substantially all the trade" through the
percentage of trade covered. 120 However, the exact percentage has
112 Article XXIV: 8 (b).
113 Article XiXIV:8 (a) and (b).
114 Article XXIV:8 (a).
115 Article XXIV:8 (b).
116 Id.
117 Bhala supra note 71, at 625.
118 See World Trade Organization, Comm. on Reg'l Trade Agreements, Note on the
Meetings of 16-18 and 20 February 1998, 115, WT/REG/M/16 (Mar. 18, 1998)
[hereinafter CRTA WT/REG/M/I 6] (where New Zealand suggested the removal of the
whole term of "substantially" due to its ambiguity).
119 Id.
120 Id. 111.
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never been agreed upon.12 ' For instance, the EC delegation
suggested in 1998 that "substantially all the trade" entailed eighty
percent of total trade volume. 122  Moreover, the EC delegation
argued that the wording of Article XXIV says "substantially all the
trade" and not "substantially all the products," thus excluding a
sector of trade is not inconsistent with Article XXIV. 123  This
opinion met different reactions.1 24  Some members stressed that
any percentage to determine the substantiality of trade should be
determined on a case-by-case basis because RTAs are all different
from each other. 125 Even if a percentage were agreed upon, an
arithmetical calculation of it would be almost impossible from an
economic perspective. 126  On the other hand, those who argued
that substantially all the trade implies a qualitative approach,
stressed that leaving out an entire sector cannot be consistent with
the requirements of Article XXIV to show a commitment to close
economic integration. 1
27
Scholars have also attempted to provide accurate explanations
when addressing the meaning of "substantially all the trade.' 28
Mathis, for instance, adopted a middle view "that would permit
duties together with other restrictive regulations to be counted
together in determining whether substantially all trade was being
covered by the agreement," while applying a strict view by
contending that duties are to be eliminated on all of the trade.' 
9
This imprecision in defining "substantially all the trade" made it
difficult for RTA parties or prospective RTA parties to prove the
compatibility of their RTA with the requirements of Article
121 See, e.g., id. § 131.
122 Id.
123 See European Free Trade Association, Examination of Stockholm Convention,
L/1235 (June 4, 1960), GATT B.I.S.D. (9th Supp.) at 70 (1960).
124 See generally The European Economic Community, Reports Adopted on 29
November 1957, 30, L/778 (March 1958), GATT B.I.S.D. (6th Supp.) at 70 (1957).
125 Id.
126 See generally id.; see also S.J, Wei & J.A. Frankel, Open Versus Closed Blocs,
in REGIONALISM VERSUS MULTILATERAL TRADE ARRANGEMENTS 123 (T. Ito & A. 0.
Kruger eds., 1997).
127 CRTA WT/REG/M/16, supra note 118.
128 Sunjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and Multilateralism: A
Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT'L L. J. 419, 436-37.
129 MATHIS, supra note 8, at 65.
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XXIV. 130 For example, in 1965 Australia and New Zealand
crafted an FTA that initially covered only half of the trade
between them and considered this coverage compatible with
Article XXIV. 13 ' Others argue that it is still hard to set a standard
for what constitutes "substantially all the trade," and therefore, the
best option is to have a case-by-case approach.
132
Unfortunately, the Understanding of Article XXIV was not
helpful in addressing the matter of trade coverage. It merely noted
that the contribution to the expansion of world trade through closer
integration between the relevant economies is diminished if any
major sector of trade is excluded. 133 In other words, it did not
come with anything new and did not establish any obligations in
this regard.
The AB in the Turkey-Textiles case highlighted the meaning
of "substantially" in two ways. 134  The AB adopted Dam's
analysis when it remarked "that 'substantially all the trade' is not
the same as all the trade;" yet it "is something considerably more
than merely some of the trade."' 35 The AB also added that the
term "substantially all" contains both qualitative and quantitative
meanings by finding that
[T]he ordinary meaning of the term "substantially" in the context
of sub-paragraph 8(a) appears to provide for both qualitative and
quantitative components. The expression "substantially the same
duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of
the Members of the [customs] union" would appear to
encompass both quantitative and qualitative elements, the
quantitative aspect more emphasized in relation to duties. 136
Likewise, the AB interpreted Article XXIV:8(a)(ii) (which
130 Sunjoon Cho, supra note 128, at 436-37.
131 See Conclusions Adopted on 5 April 1966 (July 1966), GATT B.I.S.D. (14th
Supp.) at 20, 22 (1966); Report of Working Party Adopted on 5 April 1966, L/2628 (July
1966), GATT B.I.S.D. (14th Supp.) at 115, 115-16 (1966).
32 Sunjoon Cho, supra note 128,.442-43 (2001) (highlighting the impracticability
of agreeing on one meaning of "substantially all the trade", and giving an example that
EEC countries proposed an 80% of liberalized trade to be considered "substantially all").
133 See Article XXIV Understanding, supra note 49, introduction
'34 See Turkey-Textiles AB Report, supra note 44, 48-50.
135 See id. 48.
136 Id. 49.
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requires CUs to have "substantially the same" trade regulations
with non-members) by declaring that although paragraph 8 of
Article XXIV offers some degree of flexibility, "substantially the
same regulations" demands "approximating sameness," and not
only a degree of comparability. 13 ' By the same token, the Panel in
the United States-Line Pipe case found that the United States had
established a prima facia case when it produced evidence that
NAFTA eliminated duties in 97% of the parties' tariff lines, which
was unquestionably deemed substantially all trade.1 38  Yet it
should be noted that the interpretation of Turkey-Textiles case
applies only to CUs and not FTAs since the issue of the case was
chiefly the CU between Turkey and the EC.
2. "Duties and Other Restrictive Regulations of
Commerce ": Article 8
Article XXIV:8 states that "duties and other restrictive
regulations of commerce" (ORRCs) should be eliminated on
substantially all the trade between RTA partners. 39 Just like other
Article XXIV terms, disagreements exist on what constitute
ORRCs. 140  One should note, however, that there is a the
difference between ORRC in paragraph 8 and "other regulations
of commerce" (ORCs) mentioned in paragraph 5.141 ORCs are
more comprehensive than ORRCs because the term restrictive
"equates easily with border protective measures." 142 As a result,
ORCs include "anything and everything that affects the quality of
137 Id. 50 (overruling the panel's finding that substantially all the regulations
means "comparable with similar effects on third parties").
138 See Panel Report, United States- Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, 7.130, 7.144, WT/DS202/R
(Mar. 8, 2002) [hereinafter United States - Line Pipe]. The AB, however, found that this
issue is irrelevant, and the finding of the Panel in this respect has no legal effect. See
Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, WT/DS202/AB/R (Mar. 8,
2002) [hereinafter United States -Line Pipe AB Report].
139 GATT, supra note 2, art XXIV:8(a)(i)-(b).
140 See James Mathis, Other Restrictive Regulations of Commerce? in REGIONAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 359 (Lorand Bartels & Federico
Ortino eds., 2006).
14' GATT, supra note 2, art XXIV:5, art XXIV:8.
142 Id. at 10.
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external trade, whether or not the subject matter falls within the
WTO Agreements."' 143 In other words, Article XXIV:8 does not
encompass all regulations of commerce that affect regional trade
however small; rather, it covers those regulations that have direct
restrictive effects on the flow of goods between regional
members. 144 The term ORCs will be inspected thoroughly in the
next section because it is part of paragraph 5 and has different
implication than the ORRCs of paragraph 8.
The major issue in paragraph 8 is whether or not the listing of
Articles XI (quantitative restrictions), XII (restrictions for balance
of payments purposes), XIII (non-discriminatory administration of
quantitative restrictions), XIV (exceptions to the rules of non-
discrimination), XV (exchange arrangements), and XX (general
exceptions) is exhaustive or only indicative.' 4V Such a distinction
is important to know because for example, the distinction can help
explain whether members can exclude the application of
safeguards and anti-dumping measures between the RTA
members.
We first explore whether the listing of Article XXIV:8 is
exhaustive or indicative. While we examine the arguments of
those who believe that the list is indicative, we go back to the
question of safeguards and explore the safeguards issue in
paragraph 8 as set forth in Part III: B (1).146
A minority of commentators argue that in relation to ORRCs,
Article XXIV is exhaustive, and safeguards cannot be included in
its meaning. 147  In other words, as long as safeguards are not
mentioned in Article XXIV, this should be a sign that it is not
ORRCs. If there is no 'inter alia' reference, Article XXIV as
drafted facially manifests an exclusive listing. 148 Those who argue
this point of view, such as Mathis, maintain that the list should be
143 Id.
144 Nicholas Lockhart & Andrew Mitchell, Regional Trade Agreements under GA TT
1994: An Exception and its Limits, in CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR THE WTO 217,
237 (Andrew Mitchell ed., 2005).
145 Id.
146 GATT, supra note 2, art. XXIV:8.
147 See generally Mathis, supra note 140, 92-93 (arguing that Article XXIV:8,
which deals with ORRC should be interpreted to limit ORRC is limited in scope as the
literal reading of the text).
148 Id. at 6.
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understood to be exhaustive as long as there is no clear definition
of what "substantially all the trade" is because this would permit
measures not mentioned in the list to be applied to the remainder
of "substantially all the trade" coverage.149 This campaign raises a
policy concern which is that "regional members can eliminate
internally troublesome sectors while discriminating against non-
members for the balance of trade." 150 Furthermore, scholars who
adopt this point of view argue that excluding other articles such as
Article XIX makes sense because Article XIX is an emergency
measure that might be taken in response to unforeseen
circumstances. 151  Those circumstances are typically rare and
would be frozen after the given circumstances cease, thus tariffs
are returned to their original levels.
1 52
Now we turn to the point of view that argues the listing is
indicative. For example, does paragraph 8 permit members of an
RTA to apply safeguards to products originating in the RTA?
After considering the Turkey-Textile case, some commentators
noted that the AB found that "the terms of sub-paragraph 8(a)(i)
offer 'some flexibility' to the constituent members of a customs
union when liberalizing their internal trade"; those commentators
then noted that this finding is very rational because it will permit
applying safeguards between regional trade partners.' 53 The AB,
however, emphasized that the flexibility depends upon the
condition that ORRCs be eliminated with respect to substantially
all internal trade.154 Another point of view on this issue agrees
that safeguards are definitely ORRCs as long as they are within
the insubstantial portion of the trade that is excluded for
liberalization. 55 Nonetheless, this point of view was found to be
149 Id.
150 Id.
15, Michael Hart, GATT Article XXiV and Canada-United States Trade
Negotiations, 1 R.I.B.L. 317, 333 (1987). Real life shows that safeguards are not rare
anymore. The number of safeguards disputes before the WTO alone is more than 30, as
of March 1, 2006.
152 See id.
153 Joost Pauwelyn, The Puzzle of WTO Safeguards and Regional Trade
Agreements, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 109, 127 (2004).
154 Id.
155 Lockhart, supra note 144, at 240 (mentioning a strict interpretation of whether
products subject to ORRC listed in the brackets are part of "substantial or insubstantial
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weak because, for example, Article XX permits members to
prioritize concerns like health and public policy over GATT
obligations. 156 This point of view implies that Article XX of the
GATT provides that "nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
to prevent the adoption or enforcement . . of measures a)
necessary to protect public morals . . . [or] (f) imposed for the
protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or
archaeological value.' 57  Thus, if paragraph 8 means that an
Article XX measure can only be applied to the "insubstantial"
portion of trade, then "the interpretation would prevent the
adoption or enforcement of [Article XX] on 'substantially all the
trade,' contrary to Article XX.' ' 158  Finally, there are those who
argue that the list in paragraph 8 is indicative, stressing that Article
VI, just like Article XIX, is excluded from the list; hence, if the
list were exclusive, "all intra-regional anti-dumping and
countervailing duties would also be prohibited."'
159
The first jurisprudential opinion in this regard was adopted by
the Panel in the Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Footwear case. 16  In the Argentina-Footwear case, the EC
complained about provisional and definitive safeguard measures
on imports of footwear.' 6  The EC alleged that the safeguard
measures violated Articles 2, 4, 5, 6, and 12 of the Agreement on
Safeguards, and Article XIX of GATT 1994.162 The Panel found
that Argentina's safeguards were inconsistent with the Agreement
on Safeguards.163  The AB upheld the Panel's decision with
respect to the incompatibility of the safeguards with the
Agreement on Safeguards, yet it reversed certain findings and
conclusions of the panel; those reversals relate to the relationship
portion of trade").
156 Id.
157 Raj Bhala, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW HANDBOOK 664 (Lexis Publishing
2001).
158 Lockhart, supra note 144, at 241.
159 Pauwelyn, supra note 153, at 127 n.42.
160 See Panel Report, Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear,
WT/DS 121/R (Jan. 12, 2000) [hereinafter Argentina-Footwear Panel Report.]
161 Id. 5.149.
162 Id. T 3.1.
163 Id. 9.1.
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between the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX of GATT
1994 on the one hand, and to the use of Article XXIV as a defense
to impose the safeguards on the other.' 64
The Argentina-Footwear case considered safeguards and
anti-dumping duties as ORRCs.165 The rationale for this argument
was that "that the obligation of Article XXIV:8 to eliminate all
duties and other restrictions of commerce applies only to
"substantially all" but not necessarily to "all" trade between the
constituent territories."' 66  Article XIX also indicates that
safeguard measures can be modifications or withdrawals of
concessions on imports.' 67  Moreover, the Panel noted that
footnote 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards mentioned Article
XXIV:8, which could mean that safeguards could indeed be
considered as ORRCs. 168  With regard to this, the Panel in
Argentina-Footwear case considered safeguards as ORRCs.
16 9
The AB however, reversed the finding of the Panel on Article
XXIV in general because it decided that this question was
irrelevant to the case and thus should not have been discussed. 1
70
A final point that merits attention is the meaning of the word
"necessary" in paragraphs 8(a) and (b) when those paragraphs
state that "[d]uties and other restrictive regulations of commerce
(except where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII,
XIII, XIV, and XX) are eliminated with respect to substantially all
the trade between RTAs' members."' 71 No WTO panel thus far
has decided on when a necessity occurs that will allow recourse to
164 Argentina-Footwear Panel Report, supra note 160, 8.96 & 97. The Panel
Report stated that "Although the list of exceptions in Article XXIV:8 of GATT clearly
does not include Article XIX, in our view, that paragraph itself does not necessarily
prohibit the imposition of safeguard measures between the constituent territories of a
customs union or free-trade area during their formation or after their completion." The
AB Report did not reject this per se, but found that this matter was irrelevant to the case.
See Appellate Body Report, Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear,
110, WT/DS 121/AB/R (Jan. 12 2000) [hereinafter Argentina-Footwear AB Report].
165 Argentina-Footwear Panel Report, supra note 160, 8.96 & 8.97.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 8.90
169 Argentina-Footwear Panel Report, supra note 160.
170 Argentina-Footwear AB Report, supra note 164.
171 GATT, supra note 2, art. XXIV:8(a)-(b).
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the list of exceptions in paragraphs 8:(a) and (b). Some
researchers have suggested in this regard that the necessity test of
paragraph 5 should be adopted. 172  Put differently, necessity in
paragraph 8 can be specified by the extent that a formation or
continuation of an RTA would be prevented if an ORRC
mentioned were eliminated.
1 73
3. "ORCs " Not on the Whole Higher or More
Restrictive: Article XXIV.'5
The main objective of Article XXIV:5 is to ensure than RTAs
do not negatively affect third parties. 174 To this effect, Article
XXIV:5 reads as follows:
[Th]e provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent.. .the
formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area or the
adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of
a customs union or of a free-trade area; Provided that:
(a) with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement
leading to a formation of a customs union, the duties and other
regulations of commerce imposed at the institution of any such
union or interim agreement in respect of trade with contracting
parties not parties to such union or agreement shall not on the
whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of
the duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the
constituent territories prior to the formation of such union or the
adoption of such interim agreement, as the case may be;
(b) with respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement
leading to the formation of a free-trade area, the duties and other
regulations of commerce maintained in each of the constituent
territories and applicable at the formation of such free-trade area
or the adoption of such interim agreement to the trade of
contracting parties not included in such area or not parties to
such agreement shall not be higher or more restrictive than the
corresponding duties and other regulations of commerce existing
in the same constituent territories prior to the formation of the
free -trade area, or interim agreement as the case may be .... 175
172 Lockhart, supra note 144, at 240.
173 Id.
174 GATT, supra note 2, art XXIV:5(a)-(b).
'75 Id.
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The above paragraphs have generated intense discussions
between GATT members in an attempt to agree on how to
examine "the general incidence of duties" and ORCs. 176  For
instance, the working parties explored the question of whether "the
general incidents of duties" should be calculated on a product-by-
product basis or be based on a sector-by-sector assessment; if
calculated on a product by product basis, this would occur "after
the creation of the CU vis-A-vis the general incidence of duties
applied by each of the CU's members before it enters into force.
177
To explain how to evaluate the duties and ORCs before and
after the formation of CUs, paragraph 2 of the Understanding
requires that the evaluation under Article XXIV:5(a) of the general
incidence of duties applied before and after the formation of a
customs union "be based upon an overall assessment of weighted
average tariff rates and of customs duties collected" before and
after the formation of the CU.1 78 To facilitate this calculation, the
CU has the duty to provide the WTO with the necessary data, so
that the latter can calculate the weighted average tariffs according
to Article XXIV:5(a) and to paragraph 2 of the Understanding.]%
Put differently, the words "on the whole" and "general incidence"
imply that the comparative examination should be based on the
overall effect of the ORCs, and not on individual ORCs. 180  If
ORCs overall are more restrictive than they were before the
formation of the RTA, then Article XXIV cannot serve as a
defense.
Notably, the AB in the Turkey-Textiles case was satisfied
with the accuracy of the "economic test" provided in the
Understanding,81 where that Understanding indicated that
[b]efore the agreement on this Understanding, there were
different views among the GATT Contracting Parties as to
176 Robert Hudec & James Southwick, Regionalism and WTO Rules: Problems in
the Fine Art of Discriminating Fairly, in TRADE RULES IN THE MAKING: CHALLENGES IN
REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS 47, 53 (Miguel R. Mendoza et al. eds.,
1999).
177 Id.
178 See Article XXIV Understanding, supra note 49, 2.
179 Id.
180 See id.
181 Turkey-Textiles AB Report, supra note 44, 53-55.
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whether one should consider, when applying the test of Article
XXIV:5(a), the bound rates of duty or the applied rates of duty.
This issue has been resolved by paragraph 2 of the
Understanding on Article XXIV, which clearly states that the
applied rate of duty must be used.1
8 2
However, neither the Panel nor the AB in Turkey---Textiles
case illustrated the role of the WTO CRTA in conducting the
calculation.183 Furthermore, the Panel in the Turkey---Textiles case
made a significant step by defining ORCs in paragraph 5 as
covering:
[a]ny regulations having an impact on trade such as measures in
the fields covered by WTO rules, e.g. sanitary and phytosanitary
customs calculation, anti-dumping, technical barriers to trade; as
well as any other trade-related domestic regulation, e.g.
environmental standards, export credit schemes.
Given the dynamic nature of regional trade agreements, we
consider that this is an evolving concept.' 
84
This jurisprudential definition broadened the scope of ORCs
beyond the meaning of Article XI of the GATT (the elimination of
quantitative restrictions introduced or maintained by countries on
the importation or exportation of products).1 85  It should be
emphasized nevertheless that although this definition is broad, it is
exclusive to the construction of ORCs in paragraph 5 and not in
paragraph 8, because otherwise CU members would have to
harmonize all, not just substantially all, trade-related regulations,
which is beyond the requirements of Article XXIV. 86 Scholars
argue in this regard that rules of origin should be considered
ORRCs and not ORCs since rules of origin are measures taken
upon or after the formation of RTAs (i.e. FTAs), and there is no
pre-formation in ORCs. 187 In other words, rules of origin limit the
scope of trade liberalization and restrict it, thus they have to
182 Turkey-Textiles AB Report, supra note 44, 53.
183 Zakir Hafez, Weak Discipline: GATT Article XXIV and the Emerging WTO
Jurisprudence on RTAs, 79 N.D. L. REv. 879, 897 (2003).
184 Panel Report, Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products,
9.120, WT/D34/R (Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Turkey - Textile Panel Report].
185 MATHIS, supra note 8, at 252.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 253.
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comply with the "substantially all the trade requirement" in
paragraph 8.188 In addition, both the Panel and the AB in the
Turkey-Textiles case stipulated that "the effects of the resulting
trade measures and policies of the new regional trade agreement
shall not be more trade restrictive overall, than were the
constituent countries' previous trade polices."'
' 89
With respect to FTAs, Article XXIV:5(b) reaffirmed what was
mentioned in paragraph (a). Article XXIV:5(b) added that the
duties and ORCs of each individual FTA member-country
imposed on third parties "shall not be higher or more restrictive"
after the formation of the FTA than they were before the
formation. 190 In other words, ORCs should be comprehensively
examined before and after the FTA enters into force. The
complexities of paragraph (a) do not exist in paragraph (b) since
FTAs are not required to have a CET; rather, each member
maintains its duties as those duties were with third parties.' 91
Another question that is imperative to consider is whether
rules of origin are ORCs or ORRCs. Scholars like Mathis opt for
considering rules of origin as ORRCs because rules of origin play
a role in defining "substantially all the trade" in FTAs under
Article XXIV:8.'92 Thus, as the representative of Hong Kong,
China SAR argued in a CRTA meeting, "the less stringent the
preferential rules of origin are for a RTA, the higher percentage of
their members' intra-RTA trade will be included towards meeting
the [substantially all the trade] threshold."'1 93 Conversely, another
opinion indicates that rules of origin should be considered either
ORCs or ORRCs in light of the RTA in question and in
accordance with the effects the rules of origin have on the regional
members and third parties. 194 However, it is necessary to adopt a
feasible method to compare individual members' tariff rates with
188 Id.
189 Turkey-Textiles AB Report, supra note 44, 55.
190 GATT, supra note 2, art. XXIV:5(b).
191 See Hafez, supra note 183, at 897.
192 MATHIS, supra note 8, at 168.
193 World Trade Organization, Comm. on Reg'l Trade Agreements, Statement by
the Delegation of Hong Kong, China on Systemic Issues, WT/REG/W/27 (Jan. 4, 1998)
[hereinafter CRTA WT/REG/V/27].
194 Regional Trade Agreements, supra note 68, 52.
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the degree of protection which rules of origin produce.195 In fact,
such an analogy is hard given the fact that measuring the
restrictiveness of rules of origin is intractable.
Rules of origin are per se a challenge for free trade due to their
complexity and variety. 196 Rules of origin vary within the same
jurisdiction; for instance, there are "fourteen different preferential
rules [of origin] in the European Communities, [and] six in the
United States ... ,,197 Rules of origin constitute another trade
obstacle because: first, RTAs typically create loose rules of origin
in order to control the flow of trade; and second, rules of origin
divert trade by diminishing non-regional input in regional
products. 1
98
In sum, both paragraphs 8(a)ii and 5(a) and (b) deal with the
issue of CUs. Paragraph 8(a)(ii) requires a substantial
harmonization in ORCs with non-regional trade partners.'
99
paragraph 5 (a) requires RTAs to have their expost ORCs to be no
more restrictive than ex ante ORCs.
20 0
4. "Reasonable Length of Time "Article XXIV: 5(c)
Although Article XXIV did not impose specific conditions on
interim agreements as it did with CUs and FTAs, Article
XXXIV:5 still requires interim agreements to "include a plan and
schedule for the formation of such a customs union or of such a
free-trade area within a reasonable length of time."' 0 ' In
connection with this, interim agreements do not have to liberalize
"substantially all the trade" between member-states. 20 2  Rather,
Article XXIV deems interim agreements as a transition phase until
the FTA or the CU is fully implemented.20 3  In other words, an
195 MATHIS, supra note 8, at 168.
196 Bhala, supra note 71, at 664.
197 Id.
198 OECD Rules of Origin, supra note 68, at 5.
199 GATT, supra note 2, art. XXIV:8.
200 GATT, supra note 2, art. XXIV:5.
201 GATT, supra note 2, art. XXIV:5(c).
202 WTO, SYNOPSIS OF "SYSTEMIC" ISSUES RELATED TO REGIONAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS WT/REGIW/37 available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/region e/wtregw37_e.doc
203 Id. "Any interim agreement . . . shall include a plan and schedule for the
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interim agreement must lead to a formation of either a CU or an
FTA and shall not be a type of a preferential arrangement that does
not conform to the conditions of Article XXIV.
204
The meaning of "reasonable," however, was always
205controversial. RTAs often exploited the flexibility of the word
"reasonable" to have an interim agreement for long periods of time
with insubstantial trade liberalization, such as the twenty-two year
interim agreement of the European Economic Community's (EEC)
association agreement with Greece. 206  In this light, WTO
members agreed that a "reasonable length of time" should not
exceed ten years unless exceptional circumstances require
207otherwise. RTA members who believe that their interim
agreements should exceed ten years have to provide an
explanation of those exceptional circumstances to the WTO
Council on Trade in Goods. Another challenge that the concept
of interim agreements presents is that parties to RTAs do not
typically illustrate how the RTA will be created through the "plan
and schedule" they adopt.
20 9
formation of such a customs union or of such a free-trade area within a reasonable length
of time."
204 See id.
205 See WTO, SYNOPSIS OF "SYSTEMIC" ISSUES RELATED TO REGIONAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS WT/REG/W/37, 18-19 available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/region-e/wtreg w37_e.doc.
206 See Association of Greece with the European Economic Community, Report
adopted on 15 November 1962, L/1829 (Mar. 1963), GATT B.I.S.D. (11 th Supp.) at 149,
149-50 (1963).
207 See Article XXIV Understanding, supra note 49, 3.
208 Id. An issue that is likely to appear if they notified the Council after the
agreement enters into force, particularly if the Council was not convinced of the RTAs'
explanation for having more than a 10-year period for an interim agreement. A similar
issue is likely to appear if a CRTA found that a given RTA does not conform to the
condition set forth in Article XXIV. Typically, RTAs notify the Council of when their
agreement has entered into force, and the Council and the CRTA will have, on average
two years to complete its review, however they will not be able to prevent violations
from occurring during the review. Further, it would be hard to modify the agreement
after that because the parties may have spent years negotiating it. See, e.g., BHALA,
supra note 71, at 624 (noting that the WTO has never completed a review for any interim
agreement, and the average time to review agreements is between three months and four
years).
209 DAM, supra note 102, at 282.
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C. Procedural Conditions
1. Notifying the CONTRACTING PARTIES: Article
XXIV. 7
The main objective of notification is to ensure that RTAs have
fully complied with the requirements of Article XXIV. 210 In other
words, if parties did not provide the WTO with their plans and
schedule to create an RTA, the WTO would not be able to verify
the compatibility of the RTA in question with the requirements
spelled out in Article XXIV. In 1971, the GATT members agreed
that RTAs have the duty to report the developments of their
agreements every two years. Both Article XXIV:7, and
paragraph 11 of the Understanding stress that WTO members
should notify the WTO when they intend to form an RTA.
Paragraph 11 of the Understanding, in particular, requires WTO
members to notify the WTO after they make substantial changes to
their RTAs.2 12 WTO member-states also have the duty to explain
how their interim agreements will lead to the formation of CUs or
FTAs. 2 " The CRTA, in turn, issues reports on RTAs and updates
the WTO's General Council on the ongoing regional activities of
members.2 14
In July, 2006, the WTO's Negotiating Group on Rules
approved a new transparency mechanism for all RTAs. 2 15  The
new transparency mechanism states that Members that are party to
an RTA must announce and notify the WTO of that RTA as soon
as possible, and, for that purpose, define clear timetables.216 This
210 See WTO, Report (1996) of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements to
the General Council, WTO Doc. WT/REG/2, (June 11, 1996) (stating that one of the
mandates of the CRTA is to examine the compliance of RTAs to the applicable law).
211 See Programme of Work of the Contracting Parties, Summing up by the
Chairman, L/3641 (Apr. 1972), GATT B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 37, 38 (1972).
212 See Article XXIV Understanding, supra note 49, 11.
213 GATT, supra note 2, art. XXIV:5(c).
214 See generally Comm. on Reg'l Trade Agreements, Report of the Committee on
Regional Trade Agreements to the General Council, WT/REG/2 (June 11, 1996).
215 See Negotiating Group on Rules, Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade
Agreements, JOB(06)/59/Rev.5 (June 29, 2006) [hereinafter Transparency Mechanism]
(Draft Decision).
216 Id.
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transparency mechanism will be highlighted in Section I as one of
the institutional efforts the WTO has made to put RTAs in
order.2 1
7
2. Negotiations with Third Parties: Article XXIV.'6
Article XXIV:6 requires CU members to enter into
negotiations with third parties if the formation of the CU affects
those third parties. 18 The primary objective of the negotiations is
to provide compensatory adjustment in light of the change of
duties after the formation of the CU.2 19  Since GATT Article
XXVIII contains2 2 guidelines to balance the concessions among
GATT members, 22 Article XXIV:6 provides that the procedures
set forth in Article XXVIII shall apply.
2 21
The Understanding affirmed the requirements of Article
XXIV:6 and added that negotiations should either start "before
tariff concessions are modified or withdrawn upon the formation
of a customs union or an interim agreement leading to the
formation of a customs union. 222 The Understanding, however,
indicates that for affected parties, "due account shall be taken of
reductions of duties on the same tariff line made by other
constituents of the customs union., 223 If those reductions were not
satisfactory compensatory adjustment per se, third parties shall
consider other offers made by the CU. 224 Otherwise, if the CU and
third parties do not reach an agreement, the latter can retaliate.225
Nevertheless, the Understanding emphasized that the negotiations
should be conducted in good faith 226 and these negotiations are to
217 Id.
218 GATT, supra note 2, art. XXIV:6.
219 Id.
220 See Panel Report, European Communities-Measure Affecting the Importation
of Certain Poultry Products, 1 215, WT/DS69/R (Mar. 12, 1998) [hereinafter European
Communities - Measure Affecting].
221 GATT, supra note 2, art. XXIV:6.
222 Article XXiV Understanding, supra note 49, 4.
223 Id. 5.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id. 5.
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227
continue as long as it is possible to reach an agreement.
Article XXIV:6 was discussed in the Turkey-Textiles case
when India argued that "there was no corresponding mechanism
for renegotiation and compensation for members affected by the
introduction or the increase of quantitative restrictions which were
otherwise WTO incompatible." 228  India emphasized that the
increase of tariffs and duties was negotiable pursuant to Article
XXIV:6, and renegotiable under Article XXVIII, whereas the
introduction of quantitative restrictions was incompatible with the
GATT unless an exception applies. 9 In other words, India called
on the Panel to read paragraph 6 separately from paragraph 5.
Furthermore, India invoked paragraph 4 of the Understanding on
Article XKIV which deals only with the raising of tariff and duties,
not quotas.
230
Turkey argued that India's interpretation was at odds with
Article XXIV:5(a), which includes conditions for forming CUs,
particularly where India claimed that regulations of commerce
should not on "the whole be more restrictive than the regulations
of commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior to the
formation of the customs union."231 Turkey explained that Article
XXIV:5 did not require an evaluation of the overall incidence of
regulations of commerce if, as India claims, the regulations of
commerce of the Turkey-EC CU could not "be determined by pre-
existing restrictive measures applied by the European
Communities. 232 Eventually, the Panel found that
[b]y requiring an examination of changes in applied duties, the
provisions of Article XXIV:5(a) are made unambiguously
distinct from those in Article XXIV:6, since the level of applied
duties, unlike bound tariffs, is not regulated in the WTO
framework of rights and obligations. Since the analysis of
applied duties is a basic tool in appraising the impact of actual
border barriers on trade opportunities, we consider that the
requirement of an overall assessment of the incidence of duties
227 Article XXIV Understanding, supra note 49, 5.
228 Turkey-Textiles Panel Report, supra note 184, 9.114.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id. 9.115.
232 Turkey-Textiles Panel Report, supra note 184, 9.115.
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based on applied duties clearly points at the economic nature of
the assessment under paragraph 5(a) .... 233 Thus, in the
adoption of the common external tariff of a customs union,
compensation is due if a pre-existing tariff binding is
exceeded.
234
D. The Scope of Article XXIV." Article: XXIV:5
1. The Agreement on Safeguards
In general, GATT Article XIX permits members to depart
temporarily from their obligations under the GATT, and apply
safeguards if "any product is being imported... in such increased
quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious
injury to domestic producers in that territory .... 235 The member
intending to apply safeguards, however, ought to consult with
members affected by the measures.236 If an agreement is not
reached, the party seeking to implement emergency measures shall
be free to go ahead with the safeguards within 90 days.237  In
critical situations in which damage would be difficult to repair,
emergency measures may be implemented without consultation.23 8
In either case, the measures should be applied in a non-
discriminatory manner.
The WTO Agreement on Safeguards came with additional rules
on safeguards. 239  For example, members who wish to apply
safeguard measures have to notify the Committee on Safeguards
of their intended measures. 240 The Agreement on Safeguards also
requires conducting national investigations and tests before
implementing the safeguard measures. 24  Moreover, the
233 Id. 9.118.
234 Id. 9.127.
235 GATT, supra note 2, art. XIX: 1 (a).
236 Id. art. XIX:2.
237 Id. art. XIX: 3.
238 Id. art. XIX: 2.
239 See Agreement of Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, Legal Instruments - Results of
the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter Safeguards Agreement].
240 Id. art 12.
241 Id.
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Agreement on Safeguards prohibits grey area measures. 242
The AB in Argentina-Footwear dealt with safeguards and
emphasized the importance of applying the conditions of
safeguards. 243  The Panel in the Argentina-Footwear case held
that safeguards should satisfy two main conditions: first, "the
developments which led to a product being imported in such
increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause serious
injury to domestic producers must have been 'unexpected;"' 244
second, the importing member has to demonstrate that it "has
incurred obligations under GATT 1994, including tariff
concessions. ' '245  Another jurisprudential condition, prohibiting
parallelism in applying safeguards, will be highlighted below.
Parallelism in safeguards means excluding certain trading partners
from the application of the safeguards, while including the
partners' imports from the injury's calculation.246 Countries might
want to exclude regional imports from safeguards to maintain a
positive political atmosphere with their regional partners as well as
to avoid trade retaliations. 247
The question of the relationship between Article XXIV and
242 See id. art. 1 l(b) (prohibiting gray area measures by stating that "a member shall
not seek, take or maintain any voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing
arrangements or any other similar measures on the export or import side").
243 Argentina-Footwear AB Report, supra note 164, 86-97.
244 Id. 91.
245 Id.
246 The concept of parallelism comes from Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the Safeguards
Agreement which states:
1. A Member may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that
Member has determined, pursuant to the provisions set out below,
that such product is being imported into its territory in such increased
quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under
such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the
domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive products.
2. Safeguard measures shall be applied to a product being imported
irrespective of its source.
Safeguards Agreement, supra note 239, arts. 2.1, 2.2.
247 See, e.g., Charles Owen Verrill, NAFTA and the Steel Section 201 Safeguard
Action 10 (May 28, 2003) (unpublished article) available at
http://www.wrf.com/docs/publications/l1514.pdf (discussing why the United States
excluded NAFTA's steel imports from the safeguards measures in the United States -
Steel case).
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safeguards (i.e. the Agreement on Safeguards) has several aspects.
The first aspect is the relationship between the general conditions
of safeguards with RTAs. The second aspect is when to exclude
regional imports from safeguards measures. The third aspect is
whether Article XXIV can be used as a defense when applying
safeguards.
a. The General Conditions of Safeguards and RTAs
The Argentina-Footwear case considered the conditions that
should be satisfied by a country wanting to impose safeguards on
imports. 24 8  With respect to the requirement that the surge in
imports, which causes or threatens to cause injury, one can
conclude that it is a requirement which is fulfilled all the time
because "[i]t is hard to imagine how a dispute could arise without
[the existence of] such an obligation ... .,,249 This means that
such surge occurs by default once WTO Members commit,
pursuant to the WTO Agreements, to allow unimpeded flow of
trade into their territory, thus the question becomes whether the
surge is threatening the domestic producers or is likely to threaten
them. Nonetheless, it can be concluded that the condition of
proving causation between the injury to domestic goods and the
injured country's GATT obligations can lead to the exclusion of
regional imports from the calculation of the injury if the country
applying the safeguards wants to exclude the regional imports
from the measures. More broadly, the injured party could exclude
the tariff concessions or obligations required by the GATT
2501994. In other words, before applying the safeguards, a nexus
between the injury on the domestic industry, GATT obligations
and tariff concessions should be established. This reading of the
requirement echoes the AB's confirmation in the Argentina-
Footwear case that parallelism is prohibited when calculating the
injury to the domestic market.25'
An important question arises about the relationship between
Article XXIV and safeguards: if Article XXIV:8 permits the
248 Argentina-Footwear AB Report, supra note 164, 86-97.
249 Alan Sykes, The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of WTO Jurisprudence, 2003 16
(Univ. of Chi., John Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 187 (2d Series)).
250 See Pauwelyn, supra note 153, at 112.
251 See Argentina - FootwearAB Report, supra note 164, 103, 111.
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application of safeguard measures between regional partners, can a
country exclude regional goods from the safeguards? As noted, it
is inconsistent with the legal texts and the WTO jurisprudence to
exclude regional imports from safeguards if they were included in
the calculation of injury (parallelism).252  The question that will
naturally arise, however, is whether Article XXIV provides a
defense if safeguards were exclusively applied to non-regional
imports, even if the regional imports were excluded from both the
calculation and the measures. Generally speaking, the AB in the
Turkey--Textiles case set two conditions that must be satisfied to
recognize Article XXIV as a defense for violating other GATT
articles in light of Article XXIV:5. 253  First, the measure in
question "is introduced upon the formation of a customs union that
fully meets the requirements of [Article XXIV:8(a) and 5(a)]"; 25
4
and second, the party wanting to depart from the GATT
obligations "must demonstrate that the formation of that customs
union would be prevented if it were not allowed to introduce the
measure at issue." 255 However, some scholars rightly argue that
the two conditions set forth are hard to apply to the case of
safeguards.256 The first concern is that safeguards are adopted as
emergency measures when injury or threat of injury arises after
the formation of an RTA and not upon its formation. 257  The
second reason is that proving that an RTA's formation will be
prevented unless the safeguards are activated is difficult (the
necessity test).258  Thus the best way to address the legality of
safeguards in RTAs is by determining whether the RTA satisfies
the conditions of Article XXIV:5 (i.e. restrictions on trade with
third parties "shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive
than the general incidence" of the duties and regulations prior to
the formation of RTAs), and Article XXIV:8 (i.e. the elimination
252 See supra text accompanying note 165.
253 GATT, supra note 2, art. XXIV:5 ("Accordingly, the provisions of this
Agreement shall not prevent.., the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area
or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union
or of a free-trade area ....").
254 Turkey-Textiles AB report, supra note 44, T 58.
255 Id.
256 See, e.g., Pauwelyn, supra note 153, at 132.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 133.
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of restrictions on "substantially all the trade" between regional
259
members). In other words, in light of Article XXIV:5,
safeguards should not, in principle, be easier to apply to third
parties after the formation of the RTA vis-A-vis its pre-formation.
Likewise, pursuant to Article XXIV:8, "substantially all [regional]
trade" should be liberated already before safeguards enter into
force.26°
With respect to the requirement of there being unexpected
developments that lead to an injury or a threat of injury to the
domestic market, one can argue that a WTO member should not
include the regional product in the calculation of the injury. This
is because an increase in the regional importation after the country
enters into an RTA is not an unexpected or unforeseen
development that justifies including the regional imports. Indeed,
an increase in regional imports is a natural result of creating
RTAs.
b. Article XXIV as a Defense
Footnote 1 of Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards
discusses the use of safeguards by CUs on behalf of all members
of a CU or on behalf of a single member state. 26' Footnote 1 of
Article 2.1 reads as follows:
A customs union may apply a safeguard measure as a single unit
or on behalf of a member State. When a customs union applies a
safeguard measure as a single unit, all the requirements for the
determination of serious injury or threat thereof under this
Agreement shall be based on the conditions existing in the
customs union as a whole. When a safeguard measure is applied
on behalf of a member State, all the requirements for the
determination of serious injury or threat thereof shall be based on
the conditions existing in that member State and the measure
shall be limited to that member State. Nothing in this Agreement
prejudges the interpretation of the relationship between Article
XIX and paragraph 8 of Article XXIV of GATT 1994.262
259 Id. at 135, quoting GATT, supra note 2, arts. XXIV:5, 8.
260 Id.
261 Safeguards Agreement, supra note 239, at n.1 (however, it does not mention
FTAs).
262 Id. at n. 1.
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Footnote 1 of Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards has
been discussed in two WTO cases. First, in the Argentina-
Footwear case, the AB examined facts showing that Argentina
interpreted the footnote of Article 2.1 of the Agreement on
Safeguards to exclude Mercosur members from Argentina's
safeguard measures on footwear products. 264 The AB reversed the
Panel's finding and held that "the footnote only applies when a
customs union applies a safeguard measure as a single unit or on
behalf of a Member State." Accordingly, the AB found that
Mercosur had not applied the safeguards measures at issue; rather,
the measures had been imposed by Argentina on behalf of itself.
266
Thus Argentina could not benefit from the defense of Article 2.1 's
footnote. The AB also ruled against Argentina's parallelism in
applying the safeguards, because
Argentina's investigation, which evaluated whether serious
injury or the threat thereof was caused by imports from all
sources, could only lead to the imposition of safeguard
measurers on imports from all sources. Therefore, we conclude
that Argentina's investigation, in this case, cannot serve as a
basis excluding imports from other MERCOSUR member States
from the application of the safeguard measures.
268
One might wonder, however, if excluding the regional imports
violates Article 2.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards which
requires that "[s]afeguards . . .be applied to a product being
imported irrespective of its source., 26 9 The answer is no if they
were not included in the injury determination. 270 This answer rests
on the remark that the AB in the United States-Line Pipe case
made, that safeguards "may be applied only to the extent that they
263 Argentina-Footwear AB Report, supra note 164; Appellate Body Report,
United States-Definitive Safeguards Measures of Wheat Gluten Products from European
Communities, WT/DS166/AB/R (Dec. 22, 2000) [hereinafter United States-Wheat
Gluten AB].
264 Id. 106-08.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Id. 113.
269 Safeguards Agreement, supra note 239, art. 2.2.
270 US-Line Pipe AB, supra note 138, $ 260.
2008]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
,,271Iaddress serious injury attributed to increased imports. The AB,
in highlighting this, emphasized that safeguards should only be a
tool to limit damages and not discriminate or create barriers on
trade, while taking into consideration the regional arrangement.
272
The AB in the Argentina-Footwear case did not base its
ruling on the nature of the legal nexus between Article XXIV and
the Agreement on Safeguards because the AB believed that
Argentina did not raise the defense of Article XXIV in its
arguments. 273 Rather, Argentina invoked Article XXIV before the
Panel by arguing that Article XXIV:8(a)(i) or (b) did not mention
Article XIX "among the exceptions from the requirement to
abolish all duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce on
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of a
customs union or a free trade area."
274
The other case that should be highlighted is the United
States-Definitive Safeguards Measures of Wheat Gluten Products
275from European Communities case. The United States in this
case excluded Canada's products from its safeguards investigation
into wheat gluten products based on the fact that Canada is a
NAFTA member. 276 The United States argued before the AB that
the Panel had not taken into consideration footnote 1 of the
Agreement on Safeguards, and accordingly demanded the AB to
assess the legal relevance of footnote 1 to the Agreement on
Safeguards and GATT Article XXIV in regards to the issues
raised in the case.277 The AB rejected the United States'
argument, and affirmed the Panel's finding because the dispute
"[did] not raise the issue of whether, as a general principle, a
member of a free-trade area can exclude imports from other
members of that free-trade area from the application of a safeguard
measure. ' 278 As a result, the AB ruled that the United States
violated the Agreement on Safeguards by excluding NAFTA
271 Id.
272 See id.
273 Argentina - Footwear Panel Report, supra note 160, 109.
274 Id. at 8.93.
275 United States - Wheat Gluten AB, supra note 263.
276 Id. 2.
277 Id. 13.
278 Id. 99.
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members from safeguards without excluding them from the
calculation of the injury.279
The Panel in the United States-Definitive Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line
Pipe from Korea case found that Article XXIV:5 can be used as a
defense to Article 2.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards.280 This
case revolved around a dispute over the United States International
Trade Commission's decision in 1999 which imposed safeguard
measures on imports of circular welded carbon quality line pipe.
28 1
The United States' measure consisted of a duty increase for a
period of three years, effective beginning March 1, 2000.282 The
first 9,000 short tons of imports from each country, irrespective of
their origin, were excluded from the duty increase.283 Canada and
284Mexico were entirely excluded from the safeguard measure.
The Panel concluded that the U.S. line pipe measure imposed was
done inconsistently with the GATT 1994 and/or the Safeguards
Agreement.28 5  The Panel asserted that there is a "[c]lose
interrelation between Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement,"
and "[t]hus if an Article XXIV defense is available for Article
XIX measures, by definition it must also be available for measures
covered by the disciplines of the Safeguards Agreement."
286
However, the AB in the U.S.-Line Pipe case reversed this
finding, and deemed it moot and of no legal effect, 287 because,
according to the AB, a relationship between Article 2.2 of the
Agreement on Safeguards is not relevant unless two conditions
apply.288  The first condition is whether the regional excluded
279 Id. I 100.
280 Safeguards Agreement, supra note 239 (expanding on how and when the
safeguard measures provided for in GATT art. XIX can be imposed. Article 2.2 of the
Safeguards Agreement requires safeguards to be applied in a non-discriminatory manner,
irrespective of the source of the product).
281 United States-Line Pipe AB, supra note 138, 2.
282 Id. 6.
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 United States-Line Pipe, supra note 138, 8.1.
286 Id. at 7.150.
287 United States-Line Pipe AB, supra note 138, 1199.
288 Id. 1198.
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imported goods "are not considered in the determination of
serious injury.' 289 The second condition is whether the WTO's
investigation concluded that there was proof that imported
products from third parties produce serious injury by themselves,
and thus "satisfied the conditions for the application of a safeguard
measure, as set out in Article 2.1 and elaborated in Article 4.2. "29o
The AB concluded that neither of these conditions existed in the
case, and as a result, the American exception made from safeguard
measures in favor of NAFTA products was not justified. In
holding this, the AB did not rule against the interpretation of the
panel that a nexus exists between the Agreement on Safeguards
(i.e. Article 2.2) and Article XXIV of the GATT.292
Simultaneously, the AB's finding indicates that Article XXIV can
be connected to the Agreement on Safeguards solely after the
principle of parallelism is satisfied. Consequently, discriminatory
safeguards in favor of regional imports fall under the jurisdiction
of Article XXIV.
c. When to Include Regional Imports in the
Calculation of Injury
Excluding regional imports is not mandatory when the country
wanting to apply safeguards is in the course of investigating and
ultimately determining the injury.293 Article 2.1 of the Agreement
on Safeguards indicates that the product in question should merely
be "imported ... in such increased quantities ... and under such
conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the
domestic industry. ,,294 Accordingly, the said Article does not
specify the origin of imports that are under investigation.295
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id. 51.
293 United States-Line Pipe, supra note 138, 198.
294 Safeguards Agreement, supra note 239, art. 2.1.
295 See Pauwelyn, supra note 153, at 115 (noting that Article 2.1 of the Agreement
on Safeguards only defines the limits of the investigation into the relevant import vis-A-
vis the imports, and the effect of such imports on the market without imposing
restrictions regarding "the origin of the increased imports that can or must be taken into
account in an injury determination").
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The United States-Line Pipe case tackles this issue,
addressing whether or not excluding regional imports is mandatory
when the country wanting to apply safeguards is in the course of
investigating and ultimately determining the injury.296 The AB
report in the U.S.-Line Pipe case emphasized that,
[t]he question of whether Article XXIV of the GATT 1994
serves as an exception to Article 2.2 of the Agreement of
Safeguards becomes relevant in only two possible
circumstances. One is when, in the investigation by the
competent authorities of a WTO Member, the imports that are
exempted from the safeguard measure are not considered in the
determination of serious injury.297
Hence, Article 2 of the Agreement on Safeguards can be
understood, pursuant to the U.S.-Line Pipe case, to give the
option to either include all the regional and non-regional imports
in the calculation of injury, provided that all imports, including the
regional ones, will be subject to the safeguards, or exclude the
regional imports from the calculation of the injury, thus excluding
them from the application of safeguards in light of the concept of
parallelism.298  The other case that echoes this finding is the
United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Certain Steel Products case.9 9 In the United States-Steel case,
the United States imposed safeguard measures on certain steel
imports in the form of an increase in duties.30 0 The United States,
however, excluded steel imports from Canada, Mexico, Israel and
Jordan, pursuant to its FTAs with them, while considering their
steel imports in the injury calculation. 30 ' The United States argued
that it was not required to cite each step that the competent
authority followed to recommend the safeguards and exclude FTA
296 United States-Line Pipe, supra note 138, 181.
297 Id. 198.
298 Id.
299 See Appellate Body Report, United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/ DS259/AB/R (Nov. 10, 2003) [hereinafter
United States-Steel Products AB]; Report of the Panel, United States - Definitive
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248/R (Nov. 10,
2003)[hereinafter United States-Steel Products].
300 Id 1.30.
301 Id. 1.37.
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products. 30 2 The Panel rejected this argument and found that the
competent authority should establish that the products covered in
the measure alone have caused serious injury to the domestic
industry. 303  Therefore, the Panel found that the United States
violated the Agreement on Safeguards which required them to
prove that the non-exempt imports caused injury to the domestic
industry.30 4 In this case, the AB agreed with the Panel when the
Panel stated that imports excluded from the calculation of injury
must not be excluded from the safeguards pursuant to Article
4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards.0 5 The Panel and the AB
did not require that the regional imports be excluded from the
safeguard measures; rather, it is possible to exclude regional
imports from the safeguard measures provided that they are not
considered in the original calculation of injury.306
1. The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
During the negotiations of the Uruguay Round, GATT
members agreed to incorporate the regulation of trade on textiles
and clothing within the GATT's system.307  Annex 1A of the
WTO Agreements encompasses the Agreement on Textiles which
gradually ends the quantitative restrictions of the Multi-Fiber308
Arrangement (MFA), thus placing trade in textiles under the
general rules of the GATT, and, in particular, subject to MFA.3 °9
The Agreement on Textiles contained uniform multilateral trading
standards to replace the unilateral and bilateral quotas that had
persisted under the MFA.310 In this light, the Agreement on
302 Id. 10.592.
303 Id. 10.195-10.196.
304 Id.
305 See United States-Steel Products AB, supra note 299, 450.
306 Id.
307 Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakech Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments - Results of
the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 112, art. 9 (1994) [hereinafter Agreement on Textiles].
308 See Multi-Fiber Arrangement, Dec. 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T. 1001, T.I.A.S. No. 7840
[hereinafter Multi-Fiber Arrangement] (formerly the Arrangement Regarding
International Trade in Textiles). The Multi-Fiber Arrangement constituted an exception
to MFN by which countries were allowed to place quantitative restrictions on textiles.
309 Agreement on Textiles, supra note 307.
310 Id.
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Textiles provides that
[t]his Agreement and all restrictions thereunder shall stand
terminated on the first day of the 121st month that the WTO
Agreement is in effect, on which date the textiles and clothing
sector shall be fully integrated into GATT 1994. There shall be
no extension of this Agreement.
311
Hence, over a ten year time span, the quantitative restrictions
agreed upon under the MFA were gradually phased out.312 By the
end of the ten year period, in 2005, the trade in textiles and
clothing were fully integrated within the GATT 1994.313
The language of Article XXIV:5 indicates that it applies
exclusively to inconsistencies in "this Agreement" (the GATT
Agreement).314 The AB in the Turkey-Textiles case confirmed
this understanding by stating that Article XXIV:5 is only an
exception for inconsistencies with GATT provisions. 315 The AB
in the same case, however, departed from this point of view in
deciding that Article XXIV:5 was applicable as a defense for
inconsistencies with Article 2.4 of the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing.316 The rationale of the AB is that Article 2.4 of the
Agreement on Textiles incorporated the GATT's provisions into its
own provisions when it stated that "all such restrictions
maintained between GATT 1947 Contracting Parties, and in place
on the day before such entry into force, shall be governed by the
'provisions of this Agreement."
317
2. Does Article XXIV Cover Other Agreements?
In light of the decisions of the Turkey - Textiles, United
States-Line Pipe, and United States - Wheat Gluten cases, Article
XXIV:5 is not a defense to inconsistencies with other WTO
agreements unless there is an evident relationship between the
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id.
314 GATT, supra note 2, art. XXIV:5.
315 Turkey-Textiles AB Report, supra note 44, at n. 13 (mentioning that "that legal
scholars have long considered Article XXIV to be an 'exception' or a possible 'defense'
to claims of violation of GATT provisions").
316 Agreement on Textiles, supra note 307.
317 Id. art. 2.1; see also Turkey - Textiles AB Report, supra note 44, at n. 13.
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WTO, the agreement in question, and the GATT articles.318
Moreover, Article XXIV should not be a defense unless it is
necessary for RTA member-countries to violate certain provisions
of another WTO agreement to form the RTA. Furthermore, since
other WTO agreements were incorporated together with the GATT
into one regime, Annex IA of the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization stated that if a conflict occurs between
the GATT and other WTO agreements, the latter should prevail.319
This means that the other WTO agreement in question should be
examined to see if it permits the application of Article XXIV:5 to
the provisions of the former.
E. The Relationship between the Paragraphs ofArticle XXIV
Paragraph 4 of Article XXIV paints the big picture.32 ° As set
forth earlier, paragraphs 5 to 9 encompass conditions that RTAs
have to observe. 32  The question that should be answered is what
the relationship between those paragraphs is. Is the obligation
spelled out in paragraph 4 fulfilled automatically when the
conditions of the subsequent paragraphs are satisfied?
322
The CRTA's discussions show that the parties were divided in
answering this question. 323  The first group, which included the
EU, argued that when the conditions of paragraphs 6 to 9 are
fulfilled, the requirement of paragraph 4 is satisfied as a matter of
318 Turkey- Textile Panel Report, supra note 184; United States-Line Pipe, supra
note 138; United States-Wheat Gluten AB Report, supra note 263.
319 General Interpretative Note to Annex IA, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakech Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, Legal Instruments-Results of
the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 112; see also, e.g., Laurent A. Ruessmann, Reflections on
the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference: Putting the Precautions on the WTO in its place:
Parameters for the Proper Application of a Precautionary Approach and the
Implications for Developing Countries in Light of the Doha WTO Ministerial, 17 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 905, 913 (2002) (underlining that according to Annex 1 A, the SPS
Agreement takes precedent over the GATT in case of conflict between the two
agreements).
320 GATT, supra note 2, art. XXIV:4.
321 Id. 5, 6, and 9 contain the external requirements for forming RTAs; paragraph
7 contains the requirement of notification; and paragraph 8 encompasses the internal
requirements for forming RTAs.
322 MATHIS, supra note 8, at 231.
323 See CRTA, WT/REG/M/15, supra note 104.
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fact.324 In other words, paragraph 4 is neither a substantive
provision nor an independent cause of action.325 The delegation of
Australia supported this reading, and maintained that paragraph 4
should be merely considered as a preamble .to the conditions that
follow in subsequent paragraphs. 32M The second group contended
that if new measures are implemented as a result of an RTA, this
would be an increase in trade barriers against the language of
paragraph 4. Thus paragraph 4 can be an independent cause of
action regardless of whether the conditions of the other articles are
fulfilled.1
21
Fortunately, the AB in the Turkey-Textiles case closed the
gap between the two opinions by holding that
[p]aragraph 4 contains purposive, and not operative, language. It
does not set forth a separate obligation itself -but, rather, sets
forth the overriding and pervasive- purpose for Article XXIV
which is manifested in operative language in the specific
obligations that are found elsewhere in Article XXIV. 32 8
Similarly, in addressing paragraph 5, the AB links the term
"accordingly" in paragraph 5 with paragraph 4 by finding that
[t]he text of the chapeau of paragraph 5 must also be interpreted
in its context. In our view, paragraph 4 of Article XXIV
constitutes an important element of the context of the chapeau of
paragraph 5. The chapeau of paragraph 5 of Article XXIV
begins with the word "accordingly", which can only be read to
refer to paragraph 4 of Article XXIV, which immediately
precedes the chapeau. 3
29
The linking paragraph 4 with other paragraphs is reminiscent
of our earlier discussion with regard to the objective that
.paragraph 4 confirms, which is to facilitate trade and not to raise
330barriers. In other words, the discrimination against WTO
Members that is exceptionally permitted by paragraphs 5 to 8
should also be examined to verify their consistency with paragraph
324 Id. 12.
325 Id.
326 Id. 13.
327 Id.
328 Turkey - Textile AB Report, supra note 44, 57.
329 Id. 56.
330 See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
2008]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
4. This is implicitly maintained by the AB in the Turkey - Textiles
case when it declared that Article XXIV
can justify the adoption of a measure which is inconsistent with
certain other GATT provisions only if the measure is introduced
upon the formation of a customs union, and only to the extent
that the formation of the customs union would be prevented if
the introduction of the measure were not allowed.
331
F. RTAs of Developing Countries: the Enabling Clause
In 1979, GATT parties adopted the Decision on Differential
and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries (Enabling Clause).332 The
Enabling Clause was designed to permit developed countries to
offer preferential tariff treatment to the imports of developing
countries in order to introduce equivalent benefits to both of
them.333  Similar to Article XXIV, the Enabling Clause permits
preferential treatment for developing countries "[n]otwithstanding
the provisions of Article I of the [GATT]. '334 Paragraph 2(a) of
the Enabling Clause provides that countries may extend tariff
preferences to developing countries according to the Generalized
System of Preference (GSP) adopted in 1968. 335 In general, the
Enabling Clause contains preferential treatment for developing
countries such as reduced tariffs, 336 special treatment for the least
developed countries, 337 and non-tariff measures governed by
331 Id. 146.
332 Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th
Supp.) at 203 (1980) [hereinafter Enabling Clause].
333 Id.
334 Id. 1.
335 Footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause refers to the GSP system initiated at
UNCTAD II. The UNCTAD II participants adopted Resolution 21(11), "Recognizing
unanimous agreement in favor of the early establishment of a mutually acceptable
system of generalized non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences which would
be beneficial to the developing countries." See Conference on Trade and Development,
New Delhi, India, 1968, Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development on Its Second Session, Agenda Item 11, at 38, U.N. Doc. TD/97/Annexes
(1968).
336 Enabling Clause, supra note 332, 2(c).
337 Id. 2(d).
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instruments negotiated under the GATT.338
Before exploring the regionalism question, it is worth
examining the nature of the Enabling Clause as seen by the AB in
a relatively recent case, in which a question on the broadness of
the Enabling Clause was thoroughly examined.339  In European
Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences
to Developing Countries case, India successfully launched a
complaint against the European Communities (EC) to challenge
the conditionality of the voluntary preference scheme of the GSP.
According to India, the scheme was incompatible with Article I of
the GATT.34 ° India successfully argued that the EC's drug
measures violated Article I of the GATT because they: (i)
"discriminate between developing countries because they apply
only to 12 developing countries;" (ii) were not beneficial to
developing countries since "they created market access
opportunities for some of them at the expense of others;" and, (iii)
were only beneficial to Europe and not to developing countries.
341
The AB agreed with the Panel that the Enabling Clause is not a
legal obligation per se, rather, it "contains requirements that are
'only subsidiary obligations, dependent on the decision of the
Member to take [particular] measures."' 342 Consequently, the AB
rejected the EC's argument that the Enabling Clause was not an
exception since exceptions permit Members to adopt measures to
pursue objectives that are "not ... among the WTO Agreement's
own objectives. 343 The AB found that the Enabling Clause is "in
the nature of an exception" to Article 1: 1, 44 and takes precedent
over it should a conflict arise between them.345  The AB
338 Id. 2(b).
339 See Panel Report, European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff
Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1, 2003) [hereinafter
European Communities-Tariff Preferences]; Appellate Body Report, European
Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing
Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004) [hereinafter European Communities-Tariff
Preferences AB].
340 European Communities-Tariff Preferences, supra note 339, 4.8.
341 Id. $4.41.
342 European Communities-Tariff Preferences AB, supra note 339, $ 80.
343 Id. 93.
344 Id. 126.
345 Id. 101.
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simultaneously reversed the Panel's finding that tariff preferences
under the GSP should be identical for all developing countries by
holding that preferential treatment should respond positively to
financial and trade needs of each developing country."' The AB
did not clarify, however, how an agreement can be reached with
respect to determining the needs of developing countries.347 In
other words, the AB did not stipulate whether such determination
should be made by the donor country, or the developing country,
or both.348 Neither the AB nor the Panel outlawed the idea of
conditionalities that are consistent and non-discriminatory.
349
The Enabling Clause established requirements for both
350developing and developed countries when they form an RTA.
Paragraph 3(c) requires that preferential treatment for developing
countries "be designed . . . to respond positively to the
development, financial and trade needs of developing
countries." 351 On the other hand, developed countries may not
exploit preferences "to create undue difficulties for the trade of
any other contracting parties." 352 Further developed countries may
not also seek concessions inconsistent with the needs of
developing countries. 353  Equally, developing countries are
expected to "participate more fully in the framework of rights and
obligations under the General Agreement." 3
54
The Enabling Clause asserts, just like Article XXIV:3, that the
main purpose of RTAs of developing countries should be to
facilitate trade without hindering trade with other members. 355
However, the Enabling Clause excludes RTAs among developing
countries from many conditions mentioned in Article XXIV such
346 Id. 173.
347 See European Communities - Tariff Preferences AB, supra note 339.
348 PETROS MAVROIDIS, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, A
COMMENTARY 249 (2005).
349 See European Communities - Tariff Preferences AB, supra note 339, 172.
350 Enabling Clause, supra note 332, 3.
351 Id. 3(c).
352 Id. 3(a).
353 Id. 5.
354 Id. 7.
355 Enabling Clause, supra note 332, 3.
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as the "substantially all the trade" requirement. 35 6
Some commentators argue that the Enabling Clause is an
exception to Article I of the GATT and is not related to Article
XXIV. 35 7 Paragraph 2 (c) states that
The Provisions of paragraph 1 apply to...
(c) [r]egional or global arrangements entered into amongst less-
developed contracting parties for the mutual reduction or
elimination of tariffs and, in accordance with criteria or
conditions which may be prescribed by the CONTRACTING
PARTIES, for the mutual reduction or elimination of non-tariff
measures, on products imported from one another.
358
The fact that this paragraph uses broader language to refer to
RTAs (i.e. regional and global arrangements) than Article XXIV,
which primarily regulated CUs and FTAs, makes the Enabling
Clause an exception to Article I of the GATT and not to Article
XXIV.35 9 The Enabling Clause also incorporates ambiguities that
have not yet been clarified. 360  Nonetheless, the Enabling Clause
implied that this situation should not last if a given developing
country's economic stance improves. 361  Moreover, there is no
definition in the GATT of the term "developing countries." 362 In
that light, Jackson asserts that "(the) GATT and its Article XXIV,
as well as the more ambiguous legal framework of the 1979
356 Id. 2.
357 Hanna Irfan & Gabreille Marceau, Is there a Necessity Test Within Article
XXIV of the GATT 1994? And if so, is it Applicable to RTAs Among Developing
Countries, Covered by the Enabling Clause? 6 (June 2005) (unpublished Paper Presented
to the University of Edinburgh School of Law on Regional Trade Agreements).
358 Enabling Clause, supra note 332, 2(c).
359 Id. Another opinion which has not been adopted was raised by the dissent in the
Indian case against the EC where the dissenting Member argued that the Enabling Clause
is not an exception to Article 1: 1, because [i]n the Enabling Clause the CONTRACTING
PARTIES in effect made the 1971 Waiver permanent, expanded the scope of authorized
preferences to address other aspects of the "system" developed within UNCTAD, and
added several important factors related to development and trade liberalization." See
European Communities - Tariff Preferences, supra note 339, 9.2 (determining that the
Enabling Clause is not an exception to Article 1: 1 and that India has not made a claim
under the Enabling Clause).
360 Id.
361 See European Communities-Tariff Preferences, supra note 339, 7; see also
PATRICK Low, TRADING FREE: THE GATT AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 151 (1993).
362 MAVROIDIS, supra note 348, at 248.
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Enabling Clause, are grossly inadequate for the tasks required of a
multilateral system to provide some sort of adequate supervision
and discipline on certain of the more dangerous tendencies of
trading blocks."
363
V. Regionalism in the General Agreement on Trade in
Services
After the Uruguay Round, services started to become an
integral part of many RTAs, including major ones like NAFTA.3 4
Since the GATT only regulates trade in goods, trade in services is
beyond the scope of Article XXIV.3 65  Similar to Article XXIV,
Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
considered the issue of RTAs. 366 Article V provides:
[The provisions of the GATS] shall not prevent any of its
Members from being a party to or entering into an agreement
liberalizing trade in services between or among the parties to
such an agreement, provided that such an agreement
a. has substantial sectoral coverage,[ 367] and
b. provides for the absence or elimination of substantially all
discrimination, in the sense of Article XVII, between or among
the parties, in the sectors covered under subparagraph (a),
through
363 JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 172 (1997).
364 Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Working Party of the Trade
Comm., The Relationship Between Regional Trade Agreements and Multilateral Trading
System Services, 5, TD/TC/WP(2002)27/Final (Oct. 9, 2002) [hereinafter OECD Trading
System Services].
365 Panel Report, Canada - Certain Measures Affecting The Automotive Industry,
10.271, WT/DSI39/R (Feb. 11, 2002) [hereinafter Canada -Autos]. The panel recalled
that "Article V provides legal coverage for measures taken pursuant to economic
integration agreements, which would otherwise be inconsistent with the MFN obligation
in Article II."
366 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakech Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Legal Instruments-- Results of
the Uruguay Round, 33 ILM 1144 (1994) [GATS].
367 The original footnote in the text states that "[tlhis condition is understood in
terms of number of sectors, volume of trade affected and modes of supply. In order to
meet this condition, agreements should not provide for the a priori exclusion of any
mode of supply."
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i. the elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or
ii. prohibition of new or more discriminatory measure, either at
the entry into force of that agreement or on the basis of a
reasonable time-frame, except for measures permitted under
Article XI, XII, XIV and XIV.
3 68
In light of the text, we draw the following conditions that
RTAs should observe when liberalizing trade in services.
A. "Substantial Sectoral Coverage"
Pursuant to paragraph l(a) of Article V of the GATS, RTAs
must have "substantial sectoral coverage" of the trade in
services. 369 The footnote of paragraph 1 emphasizes that the RTA
should exclude a priori any mode of supply (i.e. cross-border
supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence, and presence
of natural persons). 370 As the case of the term "substantially" in
Article XXIV, the term "substantial" in "substantial sectoral
coverage" is vague. It is not clear to what extent sectoral services
ought to be liberalized to satisfy the requirement of substantial
coverage. 37' Furthermore, the footnote of paragraph l(a)
constitutes a loose and flexible condition that can easily be
372misconstrued. In this sense, it is hard to apply the rules of trade
in goods to trade in services to specify the magnitude of trade
coverage; the characteristics of trade in goods are different from
trade in services. For example, while the tariff concept is the
backbone of trade in goods, tariffs do not exist in trade in services.
The only authoritative yet insufficient hint was provided by the
Panel in the Canada-Autos case, which stated that "the purpose
of Article V is to allow for ambitious liberalization to take place at
a regional level, while at the same time guarding against
undermining the MFN obligation by engaging in minor
preferential arrangements. '" 3
73
368 GATS, supra note 366.
369 Id.
370 See BERNARD HOEKMAN & MICHEL KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE WTO AND BEYOND 250-51 (2001).
37, GATS, supra note 366, art. V: l(a).
372 Id.
373 Canada -Autos, supra note 365, 1 10.27 1.
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B. Elimination of Discriminatory Measures
Paragraph 1(b) of the GATS states that RTAs should "provide
for the absence or elimination of substantially all
discrimination., 374 Similarly, Article V:6 of the GATS provides
that MFN and national treatment principles apply to services as
long as they engage in "substantive business operations" within
the borders of the RTA.375 In this light, the determination of the
scope of the Article V will depend on whether the list of paragraph
1 (b) is exhaustive or indicative.
During the meeting of the CRTA in 1997, this issue was raised
376when the working parties were examining NAFTA. A party of
members argued that the scope of permissible discrimination
should be examined after specifying the implications of the use of
"and/or" mentioned in paragraph l(b)(i) of the GATS.3 77  Put
differently, this point of view asserts that the "or" gives members
the freedom to choose between the elimination of existinm
discriminatory measures and the preservation of the status quo.
Other members, led by the EC, argued that Article V cannot be
interpreted without reference to Article XVII (national
treatment). 379 Paragraphs (i) and (ii) are not alternatives, rather
they are options that will be used to deal with the "substantially all
discrimination" question on a case-by-case basis.380  Thus,
paragraph 1(b) should be construed as a whole and in connection
with other applicable provisions (i.e. GATS Article XVII).
Due to the fact that the "reasonable timeframe" in Article
V:1(b) was not defined anywhere in the GATS, some scholars
argue that it is possible to borrow the principles set forth in the
Understanding on Article XXIV with regard to Article
XXIV:5(c).381 In other words, these scholars argue that the
374 GATS, supra note 366, art. V:I (b).
375 Id. art. V:6.
376 World Trade Organization, Comm. on Reg'l Trade Agreements, Examination of
the North American Free Trade Agreement, Note on the Meeting of 24 February 1997,
14, WT/REG4/M/4 (Apr. 16, 1997) [hereinafter CRTA WT/REG4/M4].
377 Id.
378 Id.
379 Id. 19.
380 Id.
381 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WTO, TEXT, CASES AND
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reasonable timeframe in Article V: 1 (b) should also be ten years.382
Again, opening the door to apply the rules for goods to services
should not happen automatically. A reasonable timeframe for
eliminating barriers to trade in services might not be the same as is
required for trade in goods. Services are liberalized by different
regulatory mechanisms as compared with goods. Services do not
involve the reduction or modification of price-based measures;
rather, they are liberalized by the elimination or modification of
regulations in the form of positive lists, negative lists, or other
hybrid methods. Consequently, declaring that a ten-year period is
a reasonable length of time might do more harm than good when
dealing with services.
C. "Barriers to trade"
Paragraph 4 of Article V is equivalent to paragraph 4 of
Article XXIV: both emphasize that RTAs should facilitate trade,
and not raise barriers. Article V:4 in particular mentions that
the RTAs should not raise the "overall level" of barriers to trade in
services. 384 This reminds us of the term "not on the whole higher"
in Article XXIV:5(a) and (b).385 The only way to benefit from the
discussions of Article XXIV in this regard is to determine the
overall level of restrictions on services by establishing a method to
compare restrictions on services before and after the RTA enters
into force.
D. Developing Countries
In contrast with Article XXIV, Article V of the GATS in
paragraph 3(a) emphasizes that developing countries should be
treated favorably.386 This special treatment should be available "in
accordance with the level of development of the countries
concerned, both overall and in individual sectors and
subsectors." 3
87
MATERIALS 665 (2005).
382 Id.
383 GATS, supra note 366, art. V:4 & art. XXIV:5.
384 Id. at art. V:4.
385 Id. at art. XXIV:5(a) and (b).
386 Id. at art. V:3(a).
387 GATS, supra note 366, art. V:3(a).
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E. Notification and Examination
Article V:7 requires RTAs to notify promptly the Council for
Trade in Services about the economic integration in services and
any other modifications thereunder.388 The CRTA will examine
the arrangements and the modifications and report back to the
Council.3  The Council may make recommendations as
appropriate. 390  No timeframes are provided to organize the
examination process of arrangements in services, except the
ninety-days advance notice that is stated in Article V:5 with
respect to GATS inconsistent modifications. 39' It should be noted,
however, that RTAs that involve services are covered by the new
Transparency Mechanism, thus all deadlines and timeframes
mentioned therein are applicable to GATS RTAs.
392
VI. Efforts for Discipline
A. Institutional Efforts
1. The Understanding
The Understanding was a good step forward in many ways.
The Preamble of the Understanding acknowledged the importance
of RTAs to world trade and warned against the exclusion of major
sectors from liberalization in RTAs. Moreover, the Preamble
re-emphasized the role that the Council for Trade of Goods plays
in reviewing RTAs.394  The Understanding clarified Article
XXIV:5 by stating that the calculation to assess "duties and other
regulations of commerce applicable before and after the
formation" of a CU shall be based upon an overall assessment of
388 Id. at art. V:7.
389 Id. at art V:7(b).
390 Id. at art. V:7(c).
391 Id. at art. V:5.
392 Id. at art. III.
393 Article XXIV Understanding, supra note 49, at pmbl. (demonstrating that the
"contribution [of RTAs] is increased if the elimination between the constituent territories
of duties and other regulation of commerce extends to all trade, and diminished if any
major sector of trade is excluded").
394 Id.
[Vol. XXXlII
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
weighted average tariff rates as well as applied tariffs.395
Likewise, it specified that "a reasonable length of time" should be
no more than ten years which can only be extended in exceptional
circumstances. 396 Those RTAs wishing to have more than a ten-
year interim agreement should provide a convincing
explanation. 397  The Understanding also demonstrated, while
explaining Article XXIV:6, that negotiations with third parties
should commence before the CET is implemented.
398
As a practical matter, however, the Understanding has
basically challenged the economic aspects of Article XXIV. The
Understanding did not answer legal questions related to non-tariff
barriers or the environment 399 or tackle key terms in Article
XXIV, 4° until the Turkey-Textiles case, the term "substantially"
had been a source of significant controversy for CUs.
4 °1
2. The Committee on Regional Trade Agreements
As set forth earlier, Article XXIV:9 requires RTA member
countries to produce all relevant information. This requirement
that should have helped the CTRA review the compatibility of the
RTA in question with the GATT and WTO agreements.42 The
403CRTA, ° a body created in 1996, has two primary duties: first, to
replace the working parties in reviewing the texts of RTAs under
the GATT, GATS, or the Enabling Clause and second, to make
systemic studies on RTA-related concerns and issues.4 °4 The
395 Id. 2.
396 Id. 3.
397 Id.
398 Id. 5.
399 Id.
400 Article XXIV Understanding, supra note 49. For instance, the Understanding,
did not tackle the meaning of "substantially all the trade," "not on the whole higher or
more restrictive," "other regulations of commerce," or "other restrictive regulation of
commerce."
401 Raj Bhala, The Forgotten Mercy: GATT Article XIV:ll and Trade on the
Subcontinent, 2002 N.Z. L. REv. 301, 322 (2002).
402 Id at art. XXIV:9.
403 World Trade Organization, Comm. on Reg'l Trade Agreements, Decision of 6
February 1996, WT/L/127 (Feb. 7, 1996) [hereinafter CRTA WT/L/127].
404 See WTO.org, Work of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/region-e/regcom-e.htm (last visited Sept. 18,
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CTRA reports to the Council of the WTO, which adopts the report
and makes recommendations.4 °5
The CRTA has discussed systematic issues, particularly related
to Article XXIV.4 06  In its meetings, the CRTA discussed
controversial phrases in Article XXIV such as "substantially all
the trade" with respect to the trade coverage discussed in Article
XXIV:8, "the general incidents of duties and other restrictive
regulations of commerce" in Article XXIV:5, and "not on the
whole higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of
commerce" in Article XXIV:5. 407  The CRTA tackled critical
questions including how to calculate the general incidence of
duties after and before the formation of CUs and what the impacts
would be of measures other than tariffs, such as anti-dumping,
preferential rules of origin, technical standards, subsidies, and
countervailing measures, yet it also recognized the complexity of
the calculation.40 8 The CRTA further highlighted key issues, such
as the relationship between Article XXIV and the Understanding
on Article XXIV, and emphasized that "Article XXIV [... ] must
satisfy, inter alia, the provisions of paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of that
Article. 409
The CRTA discussed more than once the trade diversion that
occurs in cases where a member of an FTA maintains high levels or
increases the levels of MFN protection, even within the bound tariff
410
rates. Moreover, the members of the CRTA debated the
regulatory needs for CUs and FTAs as different modes of RTAs and
noted that rules of origin have been a particular subject of
controversy, especially since it is not clear whether those rules of
origin could be classified as "other regulation[s] of commerce"
under Article XXIV:5(b). 411 Last but not least, the CRTA has
2007).
405 Id.
406 See id.
407 Turkey--Textiles AB Report, supra note 44, 9.189.
408 World Trade Organization, Comm. on Reg'I Trade Agreements, Checklist for
Systemic Issues Identified in the Context of the Examination of the Regional Trade
Agreements, Note by the Secretariat, 15, WT/REG/W/12 (Feb. 10, 1997) [hereinafter
CRTA WT/REG/W/12].
409 Understanding on Article XXIV, supra note 49, 1.
410 CRTA WT/REG/W/12 supra note 408, $ 8.
411 See SYNOPSIS OF "SYSTEMIC" ISSUES RELATED TO REGIONAL
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always been concerned about transparency, thus it suggested the
statistics which should be provided when fulfilling the notification
requirement of Article XXIV:7.4 12
The CRTA, however, faces many challenges in reviewing
RTA reports. First, some WTO members do not provide or delay
providing accurate information about their RTAs. 4 3 Second, the
large number of RTAs makes it even harder for the CRTA to
accurately review all of them in a timely manner.41 4 Third, the
CRTA has never been specific and precise in its reports.41 5 In
other words, the CRTA has on only one occasion recommended
that a given RTA has not satisfied the conditions of Article XXIV.
This exception was in the case of the Czech Republic-Slovakia
CU. 4 16  As a result, WTO Members which are parties to RTAs
have not taken the CRTA seriously, and they have presumed that
RTAs are consistent with Article XXIV upon their formation and
not upon their examination.417 Last but not least, although rules of
origin are a major topic in RTAs, the CRTA has not sufficiently
shed light on them.418
Commentators like Mathis suggest that if parties do not
disclose all information necessary to enable the working groups to
conduct an accurate review and analysis, RTAs may not argue that
TRADE AGREEMENTS WT/REG/W/37 (Mar. 2000), 31.
412 CRTA WT/REG/W/12, supra note 408 19.
413 Hafez, supra note 183, at 899.
414 See World Trade Organization, Comm. on Reg'l Trade Agreements, Report
(2005) of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements to the General Council, WTO
Doc. WT/REG/15 (Nov. 3, 2005) [hereinafter CRTA WT/REG/1 5].
415 See WTO, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON REGIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS TO THE GENERAL COUNCIL, Oct. 11, 1999, WT/REG/8, available
at http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN-
viewerwindow.asp?D:/DDFDOCUMENTSI/TWT/REG/8.DOC.HTM ("The CRTA has
only made progress on factual examination of RTAs without delivering substantive
results").
416 Peter Sutherland et al., Consultative Bd. to Director-General Supachai
Panitchpakdi, The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New
Millennium 1 (2005), 77, available at http://www.wto.org/english/wtoe/10anniv e/
future wto e.pdf [Sutherland Report].
417 See WTO, General Council-Minutes of Meeting (held on 18 and 19 July 2001),
WTO Doc. WT/GC/M/66. Issue 13 (a) (the chair of the Committee complaining about
the ineffectiveness of the CRTA).
418 MAVROIDIS, supra note 348, at 246.
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Article XXIV:7 has been satisfied.419 Moreover, Mathis suggests
that an additional consensus from the review group be obtained at
the outset with respect to the sufficiency of the information
included in the plan and schedules.
420
B. The Transparency Mechanism
Clearly, the Transparency Mechanism was a result of the
demise of the CRTA. After the inefficiency of the CRTA became
a major setback for the WTO, its members agreed to implement a
new transparency mechanism for RTAs.421 The CRTA could not
issue reports on systematic issues. By this, the CRTA created an
impression that it was not capable of dealing with RTAs anymore,
and the dispute settlement system should deal with the RTAs that
are inconsistent with the applicable law. Thus, according to the
Director General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, the introduction of
this mechanism will help, at a critical juncture in the broader Doha
round of negotiations, to break the logjam in the WTO on RTAs,
and to ensure that RTAs become "building blocks of, and not
stumbling blocks to, world trade. 422
The Transparency Mechanism requires members to newly
signed RTAs to provide the WTO with basic information on the
RTA and all relevant contact information, such as the timetables
of the liberalization of trade, preferably in an electronic
exploitable method.423 This step should be fulfilled before the
final ratification of the RTA takes place. Once the RTA is ratified,
the Mechanism requires that members of the newly formed RTA
must notify the WTO "as early as possible. 424  The drafters
correctly did not leave the meaning of "as early as possible" to
419 MATHIS, supra note 8, at 100. Mathis has built his conclusion on invoking the
EEC-Import Regime for Bananas case, DS38/R (1994), which found that the ECC
cannot argue that it duly notified the working groups of the Lom& Convention because
the ECC did not request to have the Lom6 Convention examined pursuant to Article
XXIV:7.
420 Id.
421 See GATS, supra note 366, at art. III.
422 WTO.org, Lamy Welcomes WTO Agreement on Regional Trade Agreements,
http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news06_e/rta-july06_e.htm (last visited on Sept. 19,
2007) (WTO 2006 News Item from July 10, 2006).
423 See Transparency Mechanism, supra note 215, A: 1 :b.
424 Id. B:3.
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speculation, but rather, they defined it in the same paragraph to be
upon the RTA's ratification and before the RTA enters into
force.425  This notification must include all parts of the
agreements, such as annexes, protocols, and all related
schedules. 426 Once all parts of the agreement are available to the
WTO, it should start the examination process according to a
precise timetable which does not exceed one year after the date of
427notification. To facilitate the factual examination that the
CRTA is responsible for at this stage, the Mechanism encourages
RTA members to provide the CRTA with electronic versions of
the agreements within ten weeks, or twenty weeks if the RTA
involves only developing countries. 428 Similarly, the Mechanism
encourages RTAs to fully disclose all relevant data by stating that
the WTO's factual presentation "shall not be used as a basis for
dispute settlement procedures or to create new rights and
obligations for Members., 429 With this in mind, the WTO should
make all data provided by an RTA available for the member
participating in the meeting dedicated to the consideration of the
RTA. 43  If the participating members have any questions or
comments, the WTO Secretariat should convey such information
to the members of the RTA at least four weeks before the
meeting. 431 The Secretariat on its part coordinates the exchange to
ensure that all information, questions, and answers are ready at
least three working days before the corresponding meeting.432
The Transparency Mechanism also covers the post-
implementation phase for all RTAs.433 Section D: 14 of the
Mechanism states that "[t]he required notification of changes
affecting the implementation of an RTA, or the operation of an
already implemented RTA, shall take place as soon as possible
425 See id.
426 See id. B:4.
427 See id. C:5.
428 See id. C:8.
429 Transparency Mechanism, supra note 215, C: 10.
430 Id. at C:7(b).
431 Id. at atC:12.
432 Id.
433 Id. D: 14.
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after the changes occur." 434 Unlike Section B:3, Section D: 14 did
not define "as soon as possible. 435  However, in light of the
Section B:3 interpretation that "as soon as possible" indicates that
member parties have the duty to notify the WTO upon the RTA's
ratification and before the RTA enters into force, it is reasonable
to conclude that subsequent changes should be reported to the
WTO before they enter into force. 3 This also applies to RTAs
that are already in force, thus any changes made to any RTA
whose report was already adopted by the WTO should comply
with paragraphs D to G of the Mechanism, paragraphs that deal
with the notification.of subsequent changes to RTAs.
The transparency mechanism is to be implemented on a
provisional basis.438 Members will review, modify, and replace
the provisional mechanism, as needed, with a permanent
mechanism adopted as part of the overall results of the Doha
Round.439 A thorough reading of Section H, however, will trigger
a few questions. Section H reads as follows:
This Decision shall apply, on a provisional basis, to all RTAs.
With respect to RTAs already notified under the relevant WTO
transparency provisions and in force, this Decision shall apply as
follows:
a. RTAs for which a working party report has been adopted by
the GATT Council and those RTAs notified to the GATT under
the Enabling Clause will be subject to the procedures under
Sections D to G above.
b. RTAs for which the CRTA has concluded the "factual
examination" prior to the adoption of this Decision and those for
which the "factual examination" will have been concluded by 31
December 2006, and RTAs notified to the WTO under the
Enabling Clause will be subject to the procedures under Sections
D to G above. In addition, for each of these RTAs, the WTO
Secretariat shall prepare a factual abstract presenting the features
of the agreement.
434 Id. (emphasis added).
435 Transparency Mechanism, supra note 215, D: 14.
436 Id.
437 See id. H:22.
438 Id.
439 See id. I.
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c. Any RTA notified prior to the adoption of this Decision and
not referred to in subparagraphs (a) or (b) will be subject to the
procedures under Sections C to G above.
440
With respect to paragraph a, it is not clear whether the drafters
of this paragraph intended to include RTAs. that are also adopted
by the WTO, just as it did with those adopted by the GATT
council. 441 As the Mechanism itself emphasizes the role of the
CRTA as the executive body that replaced the GATT working
parties who were dealing with the notification of RTAs, the
drafters should have made reference to the WTO instead of "the
GATT Council., 442  Otherwise, a reader would conclude that
paragraph H:22:a applies only to RTAs adopted before 1995, and
not to RTAs adopted by the WTO. Put differently, the latter
reading of Section H:22:a excludes RTAs adopted by the WTO
from reporting any changes to the WTO pursuant to paragraphs D
to G of the Mechanism. Keeping in mind that the majority of
RTAs were founded after the WTO was created, Section H:22:a
becomes meaningless if RTAs adopted by the WTO prior to the
Mechanism did not have to notify the WTO of changes to their
agreements in accordance with the Transparency Mechanism.
It should also be noted as well that Section H:22:c requires all
other RTAs that were notified to the WTO, before the CRTA has
started their factual examination, to comply with paragraphs C to
G of the Mechanism, thus they benefit from the new and expedited
procedures of notification set forth above.443 They will also enjoy
the fact that factual presentations will not "be used as a basis for
dispute settlement procedures or to create new ,rights and
obligations for Members., 444  Parties of RTAs under Section
H:22:c will nevertheless have to comply with the new and
expedited timetables and provide the WTO with the required data,
preferably in an electronic exploitable form.
Finally, it should be noted that the Transparency Mechanism
does not refer to the dispute settlement system's role in
collaborating with the CRTA in enforcing the applicable law on
440 Id. I H.
441 Transparency Mechanism, supra note 215, H:22(a).
442 Id.
443 Id. at H:22(c).
444 Id. C:10.
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RTAs. The only mention of the dispute settlement system was in
paragraph C:10, where it was mentioned to assure the members
that the "factual presentation shall not be used as a basis for
dispute settlement procedures or to create new rights and
obligations for Members.9
4 45
1. Judicial Intervention: the Impact of DSU
As the forgoing discussion reveals, the WTO era has witnessed
the emergence of new jurisprudence on RTAs. Remarkable cases
such as the Turkey-Textiles, Canada-Certain Measures
Affecting the Automotive Industry, Argentina-Footwear, United
States-Line Pipe, and United States-Wheat Gluten cases have
played a key role in clarifying vague terms in Article XXIV. 4 4 6 In
the Canada-Autos case, for instance, Canada awarded a duty-free
treatment to specified commercial vehicles by certain
manufacturers. 447  Canada justified this treatment by local
regulations and NAFTA.448  The Panel noted in its decision that
Canada's favorable treatment was not awarded only to Mexico and
the United States, but it was also awarded to non-NAFTA
parties. 449 Accordingly, the Panel stated that Article XXIV is no
defense to justify measures granted to non-RTA members; Canada
did not appeal the Article XXIV issues.
450
In fact, one of the most evident Uruguay Round achievements
is the reform in the dispute settlement mechanisms, particularly in
dealing with RTAs.451 Formerly, GATT panels could not make
binding interpretations with respect to questions concerning RTAs,
thus the decisions in some cases that dealt with RTA issues were
445 Id.
446 Turkey-Textiles AB Report, supra note 44; Canada-Autos, supra note 346;
Argentina-Footwear, supra note 104; US-Line Pipe, supra note 138; US-Wheat
Gluten AB Report, supra note 263.
447 Canada-Autos, supra note 346, at 5.162.
448 Id.. at 7.42. The Canadian laws that the duty-free treatment was passed under
were the Canadian Customs Tariff, the Canadian Motor Vehicles Tariff Order 1998, and
the Special Remission Orders. See id. 2.1-2.33, 10, l-& 10.1-10.8.
449 Id. at 7.44.
450 Id.
451 See Ministerial Declaration: Adopted on 14 November 2001, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/l, T 29 (Nov. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/min0 le/mindecl _e.htm.
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not adopted (i.e. Banana I and Banana II cases).452 This
deficiency in the GATT judicial system could be attributed to two
main factors: first, the GATT dispute settlement system per se
could not issue binding decisions because losing parties could
block the adoption of decisions and second, there was uncertainty
regarding the jurisdiction of the GATT panels on RTAs.453
In the GATT 1947 era, GATT dispute settlement panels
examined Article XXIV. In 1985, a dispute arose between the
United States and the EC regarding preferential treatment given by
the EC to some of its Mediterranean partners in violation of GATT
Article I (MFN principle).454  The panel held that "examination
or re-examination - of Article XXIV agreements was the
responsibility of the Contracting Parties. 455 Put differently, the
panel was unpragmatic in reading Article XXIV as it strictly
interpreted the absence of a clear language giving it the authority
to decide cases related to Article XXIV thus indicating an absence
of jurisdiction over Article XXIV disputes.456 Instead, the Panel
declared that the article only mentioned that the "Contracting
452 See e.g., Report of Panel, European Community -- Tariff Treatment on Imports
of Citrus Products from Certain Countries in the Mediterranean Region, 4.15, L/5776
(Feb. 7, 1985) (unadopted) (the Panel held that
[T]he examination - or re-examination - of Article XXIV agreements
was the responsibility of the CONTRACTING PARTIES. In the
absence of a decision by the CONTRACTING PARTIES and without
prejudice to any decision CONTRACTING PARTIES might take in
the future on such a matter, the Panel was of the view that it would
not be appropriate to determine the conformity of an agreement with
the requirements of Article XXIV on the basis of a complaint by a
contracting party under Article XXIII: 1 (a)).
See also Panel Report, ECC-Member States' Import Regimes for Bananas, DS32/R (June
3, 1993)[hereinafter Import Regimes for Bananas I]; Panel Report, ECC-Member States'
Import Regimes for Bananas, DS38/R (Feb. 11, 1994)[hereinafter Import Regimes for
Bananas I1].
453 See the Turkey-Textiles case, Panel Report, supra note 184, at 9.51 (denying
that there was any legal basis to prevent the WTO Panels to exercise their jurisdiction on
Article XXIV controversies).
454 Report of Panel, European Community-Tariff Treatment on Imports of Citrus
Products from Certain Countries in the Mediterranean Region, 4.15, L/5 776 (Feb. 7,
1985) (unadopted).
455 Id.
456 Id. at 59 (stating that Article XXIV is outside the scope of the dispute settlement
panel).
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Parties" are responsible for observing the implementation of the
article.457 Undoubtedly, this formalistic approach not only showed
the defects of Article XXIV, but it also showed the weakness of
the GATT dispute resolution mechanism.
The GATT dispute settlement dealt with other RTA related
cases in the early 1990s: Bananas I and //.458  Neither of the
decisions from Bananas I and II were ever adopted, therefore they
had no legal effect whatsoever. The reasoning in both cases is
worth highlighting because of the pragmatic analysis. In Banana
/,45' and //,4o the facts revolved around EC restrictions on the
importation of bananas, while excluding bananas of certain
African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries. Major banana exporters
filed a complaint before the GATT dispute settlement panel
claiming that the EC had violated Article I of the GATT (MFN
principle). 46 1 The EC argued that GATT panels should not have
jurisdiction to adjudicate Article XXIV matters in connection with
its new measurements. 462 In both Bananas I and II, the panels
correctly pointed out that Article XXIV disputes fall under the
jurisdiction of GATT panels.463  The panels in both cases
contended that the party which invokes Article XXIV as a defense
has the burden of proving that it has met the Article's
requirements.
464
The aforementioned factors that were hindering the judicial
role from being effective have disappeared in the WTO era. The
decisions of the WTO panels are binding, and both the
Understanding and the Turkey-Textiles case confirmed the
authority of the WTO panels to adjudicate RTA related cases and
457 See generally Hafez, supra note 183.
458 Import Regimes for Bananas I, supra note 352 and Import Regimes for Bananas
II, supra note 452.
459 Import Regimes for Bananas I, supra note 452.
460 Import Regimes for Bananas II, supra note 452.
461 The difference between Bananas I and II is that the complainants in Bananas II
added further grounds for their arguments such as that the EC's new measures are
inconsistent with its previous declarations. The EC response is also amended according
to the complainants' arguments. See id. 34.
462 See Bananas II, supra note 452, 45.
463 Import Regimes for Bananas I, supra note 452; Import Regimes for Bananas IH,
supra note 452.
464 Id.
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the authority of the CRTA and WTO Panels to examine.465 Thus,
most recently, in Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other
Beverages, the United States complained about certain tax
measures imposed by Mexico on soft drinks and other beverages
466that use any sweetener other than cane sugar. 6 The United States
claimed that these taxes were inconsistent with paragraphs 2 and 4
of Article III of the GATT.467 Mexico argued, inter alia, that the
WTO should decline to adjudicate the case because the dispute
should be taken by the United States to a Chapter 20-NAFTA
arbitral panel.468  Mexico claimed that the arguments that were
available to it under the NAFTA dispute settlement system were
not available under the WTO Agreements.469 Simultaneously,
according to Mexico, the United States would suffer no prejudice
if the dispute were heard by NAFTA's arbitral panels pursuant to
NAFTA Article 301 .470 Mexico also contended that if the WTO
refused to grant its preliminary request, it would be unable to
deliver a secure and positive resolution to the dispute pursuant to
Article 3.7 of the DSU.4
7 1
The Panel refused to grant Mexico's request because,
according to Article 11 of the DSU,472 the Panel did not have the
discretion to deny hearing the case. The Panel emphasized that in
465 See Article XXIV Understanding, supra note 49, 12; see also Turkey--Textiles
AB Report, supra note 44, 9.52, 9.53. The Panel noted that "the issue regarding the
GATT/WTO compatibility of a customs union, as such, is generally a matter for the
CRTA since ... it involves a broad multilateral assessment of any such custom union,
i.e. a matter which concerns the WTO membership as a whole."
466 Panel Report, Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages,
WT/DS308/R (Oct. 7, 2005).
467 Id. at II:A(2.2).
468 Id. at 111:3.2.
469 Id.
470 Id. at C:4.107.
471 Id. atE:4.163.
472 Article 11 of the DSU provides that
[A] panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before
it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the
applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements,
and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered
agreements.
DSU, supra note 91, art. 11.
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that context, the United States had a legal right to bring the case
before a WTO panel. 473  Otherwise, according to the Panel,
declining to adjudicate the case would diminish the rights of the
United States as a complaining WTO member pursuant to Articles
3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU.4 74 Thus the Panel was not convinced by
Mexico's arguments that the dispute is mostly linked to NAFTA
as a regional agreement because nothing in NAFTA precludes the
United States from bringing a claim before the WTO.475  On
appeal, the AB agreed with the Panel.
476
2. Suggested Proposals
Why should WTO Members consider reforms when dealing
with the RTA issue? This author believes that first, rethinking the
issue of regionalism will: protect third parties which, from an
economic perspective, have been impacted by trade diversion; and
second, preserving the WTO as the backbone of the global trade
system will maintain its integrity. Hence, any formula of reform
should encompass a legal aspect and a constitutional aspect.
Both the legal and constitutional aspects of reform can be
fulfilled through a three-phase solution. The first phase is
orchestrating a conference on RTAs in which the WTO reminds its
members of the controversies that RTAs are generating by
underscoring the adverse effects on the world economy in general,
on the WTO's dignity in the short term, and on its existence on the
long run. The WTO in such a conference should emphasize that it
is a safety valve that once broken, will be hard to fix or replace,
thus WTO Members understand that racing to craft violating
RTAs will affect them all at some point. In such a conference,
WTO Members should be invited to propose solutions and share
their perspectives on the issue of RTAs. Ironically, at the
conference, the WTO should encourage its members to think as a
team to find solutions, and not exploit the meetings for negotiating
regional deals (as some WTO Members, including the United
States did in Cancun). The conference, should recommend inter
alia, that the WTO forms a specialized committee-with adequate
473 Mexico-Beverages Panel Report, supra note 466, 7.1
474 Id. 7.1 & 7.7.
475 Id, 7.11.
476 Mexico--Beverage Appellate Body Report, supra note 466, 57.
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representation of members-to draft an agreement on RTAs.
The second phase should be the drafting process of the
agreement on RTAs within a defined timetable. The drafting
committee should take into account the members' contributions at
the conference, and seriously consider other scholarly suggestions.
Equally fundamental is codifying the opinions of the WTO Panels
that have dealt with RTA cases, and, in particular, considering a
transformation of the legal interpretations of the Turkey-Textiles
case on CUs into principles that can be applied to interpret similar
terms with respect to FTAs. The agreement must, moreover,
provide a legal frame work that unifies the applicable law (i.e.
GATT Article XXIV, GATS Article V, the Enabling Clause, the
Understanding, and the Transparency Mechanism) into one
comprehensive legal instrument, thus abolishing the legal
uncertainties that shadow the law and any contradictions that
might exist. This phase should not take more than two years.
Once WTO Members approve the agreement, the third phase
starts; this phase should never end. The third phase is monitoring
the results and, specifically, the compliance with the new
agreement. The CRTA should be armed with the required human
and technological resources to conduct this new role. As will be
revealed below, the CRTA should be proactive in this role, by
having the standing to require violating RTAs to bring their
agreement into conformity with the applicable law (the new
agreement on RTAs). The WTO should also have the capacity to
bring enforcement actions against RTAs for the violation(s) before
the WTO DSB. It should be noted, nonetheless, that nothing in
the applicable law gives the right to the WTO CRTA nor to the
DSB to terminate a violating RTA; the best the WTO can ask for
before the DSB is to bring the RTA into conformity with the
applicable law, and suggest coercive measures in case of non-
compliance. For this, Article XXIV:6 (or its equivalent in the
proposed agreement on RTAs) can serve as a starting point for
477
compensatory measures.
The legal aspect should provide a framework that provides for
an improved coherence between Article XXIV of the GATT,
477 Article XXIV:6 refers to Article XXVIII which allows modifications in tariffs
and schedules in order to provide for compensatory adjustments for the increases rate of
duty as a result of the creation of RTAs. See GATT, supra note 2, art. XXIV:6.
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Article V of the GATS, the Enabling Clause, the Understanding
on Article XXIV, and the Transparency Mechanism. Furthermore,
the legal aspect of reform should offer clarifications of the
controversial terms in the applicable law and explain the nexus
between the applicable law and other WTO Agreements, such as
the Agreement on Safeguards. In this light, the legal aspect should
encompass a clarification of all the problematic terms in the law.
Terms like "substantially all the trade,', 478 "not on the whole
higher or more restrictive, '479 "regulations of commerce, 48°
"other restrictive regulation of commerce" 48' (Article XXIV), and
"sectoral coverage",482 (Article V of the GATS) and provide the
different definitions to determine what each term means for FTAs
on one hand and for CUs on the other.
Particular attention should be directed towards the question of
the rules of origin since the multiplicity and complexity of rules of
origin are principal factors in fragmenting the world trade order.
Thus, a specific part in the proposed agreement on RTAs should
be designated to provide general principles of harmonization in the
criteria of tariff concessions and in rules of origin.
On the other hand, the constitutional aspect should aim to
organize the legal and hierarchal relationship between the WTO
and RTAs. In other words, this entails minimizing the
jurisdictional conflict between the WTO dispute settlement system
and the regional systems. The constitutional aspect involves
organizing the hierarchal relationship between multilateralism and
regionalism. This is a challenging task because, generally
speaking, all treaties and international agreements are equal under
international law.483  Furthermore, in dealing with conflict of
treaties, one should investigate which treaty is more specific (lex
478 GATT, supra note 2, art. XXIV: 8(a).
479 Id. at art. XXIV:5(a) and (b).
480 Id. art. XXIV: 8(a).
48, Article XXIV Understanding, supra note 49.
482 GATT, supra note 2, art. V:I(a).
483 See Thomas Cottier & Marina Foltea, Constitutional Functions ofthe WTO and
Regional Trade Agreements, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL
SYSTEM 359 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006), supra notes 1, 43, 51
(explaining that "[e]xcept for the United Nations Charter under Article 103, none of [the
international agreements] prevails over another unless this is provided for by explicit
treaty language either in a dominating or a submissive treaty").
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specialis) and which treaty is more recent (lex posterior) to decide
which one prevails. In the case of RTAs, this approach will not be
sufficiently helpful because one should examine each RTA versus
the WTO Agreements to decide which of those would render the
effort to provide a general and abstract law on the relationship
between the WTO Agreements and RTAs senseless.
Simultaneously, the constitutional reform does not entail
assimilating the regional trade order into the multilateral one since,
as a matter of principle, mixing two legal "orders" generates
disorder because each order has its own principles and
objectives.484 Likewise, a complete segregation of legal orders
like regionalism and multilateralism generates disorder because
both function in the same international trade matrix. However, if
both orders were to serve the same purpose, the result would be
positive. As Adam Smith metaphorically puts it when arguing
against mixing orders:
The man of system ... seems to imagine that he can arrange the
different members of a great society with as much ease as the
hand arranges the different pieces upon a chess-board. He does
not consider that the pieces upon.the chess-board have no other
principle of motion besides that which the hand impresses upon
them; but that, in the great chess-board of human society, every
single piece has a principle of motion of its own, altogether
different from that which the legislature might chuse (sic) to
impress upon it. If.those two principles coincide and act in the
same direction, the game of human society will go on easily and
harmoniously, and is very likely to be happy and successful. If
they are opposite or different, the game will go on miserably,
and the society must be at all times in the highest degree of
disorder.48
5
The constitutional reform requires changes in both the legal
norms of the WTO and in every RTA. This means that the WTO
should (perhaps in the new agreement on RTAs) include a part
that addresses the conflicts between the WTO laws and the legal
provisions of RTAs. RTAs for their part, especially those which
entered into force after the WTO Agreements took effect,
486
484 See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENT (1979).
485 Id. VI.II.42.
486 RTAs that entered into force after 1995 might refer to the principle of lex
posterior to evade the effect of WTO Agreements in terms of conflict, thus it is critical
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should make amendments to their agreements to recognize WTO
Agreements as prevailing laws in case of conflict.
On the jurisdictional front, the DSB in the Mexico-Beverages
case has already asserted, in light of Article 23 of the DSU, that
nothing can stop the WTO Panels from exercising jurisdiction on
disputes between regional members when a member of an RTAs
brings claims to the WTO in its capacity as a member of the
487WTO. Even if a regional panel has issued a decision on the
matter presented to the DSB for settlement, the principle of res
judicata would not be applicable to erode the latter's jurisdiction
since the DSB will be applying different laws (i.e. the WTO
Agreements) and not the legal text of the relevant RTA.488 The
WTO DSB, in light of Articles 13 and 11 of the DSU, may use
evidence from the regional litigation to proceed with settling the
489dispute pursuant to the WTO law. This also should be codified
in the proposed agreement on RTAs.
Bringing the multilateral order and regional order into a
coherent or at least a non-contrasting form requires goodwill and
bona fide resolve on the part of the WTO Members. Practically
speaking, one cannot totally depend on such goodwill to fix the
status quo because, in practice, as long as cooperation is voluntary,
WTO Members will not react unless this reaction benefits them in
any economic or political respect. WTO Members should be
mindful that chaotic RTAs generate legal uncertainty in the
international trade system and that they have already increased
costs, and reduced "the quantity and time horizon of foreign trade
and investments.' ' 490 Unless this is corrected, trade patterns
including multilateralism and regionalism will form spontaneous
trade orders which produce international trade practices without
to seal this loophole from the outset.
487 See Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, supra note
466.
488 See Vaughan Lowe, Overlapping Jurisdiction in International Tribunals, 20
AUSTRALIAN Y.B. ON INT'L L. 203 (1999) (arguing that litigating a case under one treaty
does not prohibit litigating the case under another treaty).
489 Article 13 of the DSU gives the DSB the authority to ask the parties to supply
any relevant information necessary to settle the dispute. Article 11 therefore requires the
WTO Panels to objectively assess all information, facts and evidence in this regard.
490 ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 9 (1991).
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coherence and consistency. This creates a fragmented multilateral
trade order in which WTO Members tend to rest more on their
regional arrangements than the directed and properly structured
multilateral trade order.491
Assuming that goodwill exists, the constitutional and legal
aspects of reform should introduce rules that do not assume natural
harmony, but rely on solidly grounded and enforceable rules
capable of achieving an acceptable degree of harmonization
492between foreign trade and domestic laws and policies. In this
light, one of the most basic, yet effective, tools to ensure
enforceability of rules is to agree on a legal liability mechanism
that entails retaliation against violating RTAs (pact sunt
servanda). This requires a centralized body (i.e. the WTO) to
have the capacity to sue violating RTAs before the WTO Panels.
Put differently, the WTO has to become not only the coordinator
between its members with respect to international trade, but it has
also to step forward and be an active player on the ground. This
contributes to bringing the world trade back from a power oriented
system that relies on bilateralism and negotiation powers to a rule-
oriented system with established durable principles of law which
reconcile the interests of all WTO Members, including those
members who are actively seeking WTO-compliant RTAs.
There have been constructive efforts to suggest reforms on the
part of WTO Members and legal scholars as highlighted above.
All these efforts should be taken into consideration by the WTO.
In fact, such efforts have resulted in substantial and tangible
achievements like the Understanding on Article XXIV in the
Uruguay Round.494 For instance, since the Understanding stated
491 See id. at 17. Petersmann divided international economic orders into
"spontaneous" and "directed". The spontaneous orders grow out of custom without
initial overall design, while directed refers to the economic trade regimes that are created
by international agreements. See generally, Sungjoon Cho, Defragmenting World Trade,
27 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 39 (2006) (outlining how a weak multilateral system vis-A-
vis RTAs is not desired).
492 See id. at 62 (citing Hume, Smith and Kant who do not assume that individual
interests are divergent and can only be reconciled by the observance of rules).
493 See id. at 104 (explaining that a power-oriented system asserts powers by
bilateral negotiations, unilateral threat which aims at maximizing the negotiation
capacity, and comparing it with a rule-oriented system which has sets of generally
accepted rules that offer long term stability and predictability).
494 Article XXIV Understanding, supra note 49.
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that interim agreements "should exceed ten years only in
exceptional cases," the number of violating RTAs to this
requirement has been shrinking according to the WTO Secretariat
report of 2002.
49 5
VII.Conclusions
This article has attempted to highlight the major legal
questions that occur when examining RTAs and their relationship
with the WTO legal order. Although RTAs are an economic
phenomenon in the first place, their legal aspect should not be
underestimated. A healthy legal interaction between
multilateralism and regionalism can ensure the integrity of the
WTO, and simultaneously, can enable RTAs to be building blocks
in the world trade order. However, so far there is no consensus on
what is the best way to reform the relevant rules to minimize the
loopholes that members to RTAs often exploit, albeit sometimes
unintentionally.
The good news is that the WTO, and its members, are aware of
the legal challenges that RTAs present. In his speech in Bangalore
in January 2007, Pascal Lamy, the Director-General of the WTO,
stressed that RTAs should not replace the multilateral system.
496
He went beyond the traditional approach of criticizing RTAs and
argued that they are not an easier way of facilitating trade, but
rather, they complicate the trading environment by creating a web
of incoherent rules, such as the numerous different rules of
origin.497 In this light, he offers harmonizing rules of origin to
simplify regional trade and enhance the relationship between
multilateralism and regionalism. 498  He also shared with the
participants the WTO's attempts to contain RTAs, such as the
495 World Trade Organization, Comm. on Reg'l Trade, Coverage, Liberalization
Process and Transitional Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements, Background Survey
by the Secretariat, 18, WT/REG/W/46 (Apr. 5, 2002) (revealing that, for many of the
RTAs entering into force in the latter half of the 1990s, "only in rare cases do transition
periods exceed ten years").
496 Pascal Lamy, Speech at Confederation of Indian Industries Partnership Summit
2007, Multilateral or bilateral trade agreements: which way to go? (Jan. 17, 2007)
(transcript available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/sppl-e/sppl53-e.htm).
497 See id.
498 See id.
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Transparency Mechanism. 49
9
What is really puzzling is that those members who are meeting
to discuss how to discipline RTAs are those who are negotiating
RTAs at a rapid pace. By the same token, those WTO Members
who form RTAs that are inconsistent with WTO rules are the same
who agreed on the Transparency Mechanism in 2006 to enhance
notification and examination of RTAs. These facts will render the
attempts to accommodate RTAs in the multilateral system
inefficient if the root cause of the problem is not addressed. In
other words, unless Articles XXIV of the GATT and V of the
GATS are clarified in light of the latest developments, it would be
hard to make significant progress. It is true that the
Understanding on Article XXIV was a remarkable step for
clarifying, to some extent, the vague terms, but still, neither
Article XXIV nor the Understanding on Article XXIV mention
issues of emerging importance like investment and intellectual
property, subjects that are increasingly being incorporated in
RTAs.
It is crucial therefore to reform the applicable rules in a way
that fosters cooperation between the multilateral and regional
regimes, while attempting simultaneously to minimize the
competition between them. This can be done both on the regional
and multilateral level. On the regional level, RTAs should include
provisions or phrases in their preamble that affirm the importance
of being consistent with WTO laws. In this light, the true test for
RTAs now is compliance with the Transparency Mechanism. On
the multilateral level, the WTO should consider having a clause
that emphasizes the supremacy of the WTO system over RTA
laws. This would be very useful when conflicts of law occur
between a regional law and the multilateral one. The
Transparency Mechanism is also a test for the WTO; the WTO
should consider having a CRTA that is adequately staffed and
equipped to deal with the increasing number of RTAs.
499 Id.
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